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I. INTRODUCTION 
A change in technology invariably leads to a change in the 
absolute and relative levels of living of participants in an 
economy. In the United States, for example, technical change 
embodied in machinery and chemicals has led (when conditioned 
by market prices and producers' strategies) to increased use of 
these factors in the agricultural sector over, at least, the 
past 50 years. The increased use has contributed to severe 
structural readjustment in the sector with respect to farm 
numbers, farm size and input mix. In turn, this has led to a 
general depression of rural-family incomes relative to urban 
incomes, and a widening of the income disparity within the 
sector.^ A similarly-generated problem of growing inequity in 
2 income distribution has emerged in Canadian agriculture. 
Moreover, this general phenomena is not limited to agri­
culture alone. Lave^ reviews a considerable literature which 
traces the incidence of technical innovation and its diffusion 
^A review of the spectrum of changes, problems created, 
and policies suggested for the solution of problems is given in 
the 20 essays in A. Gordon Ball and Earl 0. Heady, eds.. Size, 
Structure, and Future of Farms (Ames: Iowa State University 
Press, 1972). 
2 See Robert W. Crown and Earl O. Heady, Policy Integra­
tion in Canadian Agriculture (Ames : Iowa State University 
Press, 1972). 
\ester B. Lave, Technical Change; Its Conception and 
Measurement (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1966) 
(especially chapter 10). 
2 
through to an impact on firm size, firm numbers, and the 
distribution of income among factors of production in manu­
facturing industries as well as service trades. He reports 
results which indicate tendencies similar to those in agri­
culture—declining firm numbers, increasing size of survivor 
firms, and realignment of factor shares. 
Recent dramatic changes in the agricultural technology 
relating seeds, fertilizer and water to the production of wheat 
and rice (the green revolution) in Asia have set in motion 
forces leading to the restructuring of agriculture. In that 
continent, as well as in North America, an equity problem has 
emerged with respect to the distribution of the benefits of the 
new technology, with attendant social and political repercus­
sions . 
In India, as an example, the introduction of H.Y.V.'s has 
led to a concentration of land under the direct management of 
former landlords and owners, the removal of traditional tenants, 
and the formation of new tenancy arrangements in which large 
landowners acquire land from small landowners. In addition, 
there has been a growing desire to substitute machinery for 
labor, even though labor has been in general plentiful (but 
scarce in peak seasons) and seasonally underemployed. This has 
developed as farm managers attempt to ensure a certain source 
of power at critical times in the production process and to 
acquire power sources that do not attempt to exploit a 
3 
potential shortage situation by demanding wages rates in excess 
of productivity (as labor has attempted to).^ 
A situation thus seems to be emerging in India, in which 
an already inequitable distribution of income will become even 
less equitably distributed, in spite of the advent of a 
2 technical change with the power to improve it. If current 
socio-political structures survive, institutions continue their 
usual operational practices, and government continues to imple­
ment policy through established instruments (that is, without 
qualitative economic policy change), Gotsch^ predicts. 
See Francine R. Frankel, India's Green Revolution: 
Economic Gains and Political Costs (Princeton; Princeton 
University Press, 1971). Frankelconsiders the impacts of the 
green revolution in both wheat and rice-growing regions of 
India, and relates the changes in factor shares, tenancy, and 
so on to the political rise of communistic groups, pressing for 
equality of incomes through equality of resource ownership. 
2 Bruce F. Johnston and John Cownie, "The Seed-Fertilizer 
Revolution and Labor Force Absorbtion," Amer. Econ. Review, 
LIX, 569-82 (September, 1969). They argue that the green 
revolution can be viewed as labor using, with the implication 
that landless laborers in rural areas can gain through higher 
wages, ceteris paribus. 
^Carl H. Gotsch, "Technical Change and the Distribution 
of Income In Rural Areas," Amer. Journ. of Agric. Econ., 
LIV, 326-41 (May, 1972). The model developed there is quali­
tatively stated, but relates social-state considerations and 
hypothesis concerning likely actions by individuals in the 
political arena to the redistribution of income over time. The 
assumptions behind the prediction are that the green revolution 
is a simple, divisible and labor-using technical change; that 
the initial land distribution is uneven; that the institutional 
setting is initially centralized, and that social structure is 
hierachical. These assumptions appear reasonable for India, 
even though Gotsch was considering the phenomenon in Pakistan. 
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qualitatively 
"The likely pattern (of future income distribution) 
would involve small farmers becoming better off 
relative to their previous position but worse off 
relative to their larger neighbors. 
Similar tendencies appear likely throughout the less developed 
2 
world. 
A problem of inequity resulting from technical change has 
been seen as a general expectation in economic life, with the 
result that attempts to predict the income redistribution 
impacts of specific changes have earned considerable attention 
in theoretical and applied literature. A review of some of 
this literature follows in a subsequent section. The litera­
ture appears, however, to emphasize the impacts of technical 
change as revealed in changing factor service prices and levels 
of employment (that is, in changing factor shares. But a 
simple demonstration shows that even full knowledge of the 
movement of factor shares, only weakly suggests the direction 
and extent of changes in individual incomes (the size-
distribution of income). 
^Gotsch, "Technical Change and the Distribution...", 
p. 339. 
2 See a more general review in Donald B. Keesing, Causes 
and Implications of Growing Inequality of Income Within 
Developing Countries, Memorandum 127 (Stanford: Research 
Center in Economic Growth, Stanford University, February, 1972). 
Keesing argues that policy action will be the only means of 
reducing income disparities in LDC's since forces are at work 
that widen disparities, time can only accentuate the dis­
parities, and decentralized decision-making is ineffective in 
the face of economy-wide forces. 
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A. Purpose and Objectives of This Study 
The purpose of this study is to develop and illustrate the 
use of a model for the prediction of the likely impacts of 
technical change at the individual's income level. The model 
is intended to yield a quantitative measurement of the direc­
tion and extent of the change in relative size-distribution of 
income, and so indicate the possible emergence of a growing, 
continuing, or declining equity problem directly. The basis of 
the model will be an optimization technique so that predictions 
will be internally consistent.^ 
The model should provide two additional outputs: first, 
a basis for estimating the changes in relative factor shares; 
secondly, a framework for experimentation with programs aimed 
at redistributing income among individuals through policy 
manipulation. 
The emphasis on the individual as distinct from the factor 
services he sells is maintained in an attempt to provide a 
model for the analysis of socio-economic phenomena. It is, in 
discussion of projections made in a consistency frame­
work is contained in Erik Thorbecke and Jati K. Sengupta, "A 
Consistency Framework for Employment, Output, and Income 
Distribution Projections Applied to Columbia" (paper presented 
to the Development Research Center, International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, Washington, D.C. 1972). The 
authors use the input-output concept of a consistency framework, 
but the constrained optimization technique also falls within 
the definition of "consistency". 
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the final analysis, individuals who perceive injustices, form 
judgements and feel motivation, riot and overthrow established 
governments, not abstract factors of production at aggregated 
levels. The Marxian assumption of a pure laborer, capitalist 
or rentier, that is an assumption of a one-factor-man, may 
actually reflect the true situation in one society or other, 
but a generally applicable model for the analysis of impacts of 
technical change should not preclude the possibility that the 
Marxian view is oversimplified. 
Some of the more significant assumptions in the construc­
tion and application of the model will include: 
(a) the assumption that income (appropriately defined) 
is a reasonable proxy for wellbeing, so that 
analytic results with respect to the distribution of 
income can be easily interpreted as results for 
welfare distribution; 
(b) the assumption that socio-political interactions are 
subsumed in the behavioural relationships used; 
(c) the assumption that a consistent aggregation of 
individuals into classes is possible and successfully 
done, and 
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(d) the assumption that for all practical purposes, 
technical change is embodied in factors of pro­
duction. ^ 
The concept of disembodied technical change (that is a 
change that enters the economy free of a medium of transfer, 
such as a costless reorganization of production processes) 
persists in economic theory, as does the notion that it can 
have neutral impacts on relative factor productivities. 
Jorgenson, however, argues that 
"...there is a one-to-one correspondance between the indices 
of total factor productivity and the errors in the price of 
investment goods that can make the rate of growth in 
measured total factor productivity equal to zero. In view 
of this correspondance, one can never distinguish a given 
rate of growth in total factor productivity from a corre­
sponding rate of growth in the error in measurement of the 
price of investment goods." 
[D. W. Jorgenson, "The Embodiment Hypothesis," Journal of 
Political Economy, LXXIV, 1-17 (February, 1966)]. Solow has 
made similar claims : 
"Improvements in technology affect output only to the extent 
that they are carried into practice either by net capital 
formation or by replacement of old-fashioned equipment by 
the latest models with the consequent shift in the distribu­
tion of equipment by date of birth." 
[R. Solow, "Investment and Technical Progress" in Mathematical 
Models in Social Sciences, ed. by K. J. Arrow, S. Karlin, and 
P% Suppes (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959) p. 91.] 
The origins of the disembodiment concept are traced to 
Hicks. Early definitions of the embodiment concept are traced 
to Harrod and Robinson (who assumed that technical change 
entered as an improvement in the efficiency of the labor force 
using the same capital stock). Allen reviews these earlier 
developments in R. G. D. Allen, Macro-Economic Theory: A 
Mathematical Treatment (London: St. Martin's Press, 1968), 
chapter 13. 
Heady viewed technical change as embodied (implicitly) 
when he defined technical change as being either mechanical or 
biological. A mechanical innovation was seen as one that 
changes the desire of the operator to substitute capital for 
labor (although this does not mean that labor would be un­
employed) , while a biological innovation simply changed plant 
physiology. But these biological changes usually require a 
change in the relative intensities of factor inputs, so that 
they are qualitatively different from neutral technical changes. 
[Earl 0. Heady, (footnote continued on following page) 
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B. Prediction and Measurement of Impacts 
on Income Distribution 
To date, the most common method for gauging the impacts of 
technical change on income distribution has been through move­
ments in relative factor shares under the impetus of the 
innovation. Factor share analysis, of functional income dis­
tribution study, has come to occupy the central position in the 
overall consideration of income distribution^, and has come to 
have a theoretical life of its own. Spacial and sectoral 
2 income distribution has received some attention but research 
in these areas has been largely empirical, and has relied 
largely on factor share movements to explain observed change. 
(footnote continued from previous page) "Basic Economic and 
Welfare Aspects of Farm Technological Advance," Journal of 
Farm Economics, XXXI, 293-316 (May, 1949)]. 
^In addition to text books on economic theory, the 
emphasis is evident in scholarly works such as : Martin 
Bronfenbrenner, Income Distribution Theory (Chicago: Aldine-
Atherton Press, 1971) and Lester B. Lave,Technical Change, Its 
Conception and Measurement (Englewood Cliffs; Prentice-Hall 
1966). 
2 See, as an example, Agricultural Policy Institute, North 
Carolina State University, Income Distribution Analysis 
(Raleigh, author, 1966). 
9 
1. Theoretical considerations 
Functional income distribution theory depends on the 
specification of an aggregate production function. The func­
tion can be quantified or not depending on the purpose of the 
study using it. The important point is that the production 
function specified is generally assumed to be revealed, or, in 
effect, an ex post entity. 
As an ex post phenomenon, the aggregate production function 
exists in the context of a set of factor and output prices, and 
a set of approximate quantities of factor services employed.^ 
Thus the parameters exist that allow for the specification of 
the point elasticity of production namely: the marginal 
products of the various factors employed at equilibrium levels, 
the quantities employed, and the prices at which the inputs 
were employed. Technical changes can thus be observed as 
changes in the elasticity of production (through change in 
relative factor productivities, prices, and employed quantities) 
and changes in the input mix. 
^Conceptually, the ex post production function might be 
viewed as being the aggregation of the various firm equilibrium 
positions; as if the economy had found a state of equilibrium 
such as that depicted in models of production and exchange. 
See, for example, the systems described in Robert E. Kuenne, 
The Theory of General Economic Equilibrium (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1963) chapters 2, 3; or Bent Hansen, 
A Survey of General Equilibrium Systems (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1970) chapters 2, 3~. 
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Several theorems have been developed that relate the 
changes in elasticity of production and factor mix to the re­
distribution of income among factors. These theorems serve to 
predict the change in relative factor shares following innova­
tion.^ They can be briefly stated as follows: 
1) If a technical change is factor saving, ceteris 
paribus, the share of income accruing to that factor declines. 
(In a two factor case, this means that a labor-saving or 
capital-augmenting technical change has the effect of reducing 
labor's share). 
2) If a technical change increases the ease of sub­
stituting factors for each other (that is, if it raises the 
value of the elasticity of substitution) relative factor shares 
will move in favor of the factor whose supply is rising. Con­
versely, if the technical change reduces the ease of substitu­
tion, the factor experiencing growth would lose relative 
position. This would follow since rising supply of one factor 
would tend to reduce per-unit return if employment prospects 
were not also growing, while the factor in relatively fixed 
supply would simply retain or experience rising per-unit 
2 
returns. 
^Por proof of the theorems, see Murry Brown, On the 
Theory and Measurement of Technical Change (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1966) chapter 12. 
2 Brown, On the Theory..., pp. 55-56. 
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3) With an elasticity of substitution less than unity, a 
factor experienceing increased supply relative to other factors 
would lose relative share, but with the elasticity of substi­
tution in excess of unity, a relatively growing factor gains 
relative income position.^ 
With these theorems, and with quantitative measures of 
the elasticity of substitution and the factor proportions, the 
impact of technical change on factor shares can be predicted. 
The question is, however, to specify and quantify an aggregate 
production function to get the quantitative measurements needed. 
2. Quantifying aggregate production functions 
Three methodological thrusts have been made towards 
specifying and quantifying aggregate production functions; the 
major differences in the methods being the a priori choice of 
2 the functional form. 
The Cobb-Douglas form of the function has been widely used 
for analysing changes in income distribution. Indeed, it was 
the intention of the inventors of the form to study the 
^If a Cobb-Douglas production function were assumed so 
that the elasticity of substitution were unity, changes in 
factor supply would not influence relative factor shares, since 
the change in factor use would be equal to the percent change 
in relative prices. 
strictly speaking, there are only two forms of the pro­
duction function considered, while a third approach subsumes 
the specified production function. None of the vast literature 
on forms and quantification of firm-level production functions 
is considered here. 
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relationship between the share accruing to factors of produc­
tion and their marginal products.^ With later developments, 
the initial restrictions that the form conform only to con­
stant returns to scale, have been relaxed. However, the Cobb-
Douglas function invariably yields elasticity of substitution 
2 
equal to unity regardless of the scale economies involved. 
Nevertheless, the form lends itself well to theoretical con­
siderations, and can be used to estimate the relative factor 
shares directly (as the ratios of the elasticities of produc­
tion^) . 
The recent invention of the Constant Elasticity of 
Substitution production function (claimed by two sets of 
authors^), permitted the estimation of non-unity elasticities 
of substitution, in addition to yielding all of the properties 
of the Cobb-Douglas function, useful in the analysis of factor 
The work of Paul Douglas and other innovators in the 
field of factor share analysis is given in Brown, On The 
Theory.... A synthesis of the literature cast in the Cobb-
Douglas framework is also given in chapter 8. 
2 Proof of this point is found in Brown, On The Theory..., 
p. 35. 
^Proof of this and other properties of the Cobb-Douglas 
production function are found in Brown, On The Theory..., 
Chapter 3. 
^They are K. Arrow, H. B. Chenery, B. Minhas and R. Solow, 
"Capital-Labor Substitution and Economic Efficiency," Rev, of 
Economics and Statistics, XLII, 225-50 (August, 1961); and M. 
Brown and J. S. de Cani, "Technical Change and the Distribution 
of Income," International Labor Review, IV, 289-309 (September, 
1963). 
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share change under technical advance. The functional form is, 
however, difficult to quantify, owing to the interdependencies 
of the elements comprising the parameters. A "two-stage" 
fitting procedure is required, which detracts from the useful­
ness of the form in applied analysis.^ Further, the function 
is generally not specified for more than two classes of input. 
2 Even so, economists have found the form useful. In addition, 
the theoretical promise of the functional form has encouraged 
3 
several efforts to generalize it to more classes of input, 
4 
and to quantify the multi-input forms. 
A third distinct methodology for the study of technical 
change and its impacts on factor shares has avoided the problem 
of functional-form specification altogether. Mathematical 
^Brown, On The Theory..., cites three methods of fitting 
the function all with the same difficulty. 
2 In addition to the many citations in Brown, On The 
Theory..., chapter 9, see M. D. McCarthy, "Embodied and Disem-
bodied Technical Progress in a CES Production Function," Rev, 
of Economics and Statistics, XLVII, 71-75 (1965); and H. 
Kaneda, "Substitution of Labor and Non-Labor Inputs and Techni­
cal Change in Japanese Agriculture," Rev, of Economics and 
Statistics, XLVII, 163-71 (1965). 
^H. Uzawa, "Production Functions with Constant Elastici­
ties of Substitution," Rev, of Economic Studies, XXIX^ 291-99 
(October, 1962; V. Mukerji, "Generalized SMAC Function with 
Constant Ratios of Elasticities of Substitution," Rev, of 
Economic Studies, XXX, 233-36 (October, 1963). 
4 K. Sato, "A Two-Level Constant Elasticity of Substitution 
Production Function," Rev, of Economic Studies, XXXIV, 201-18 
(April, 1967). S. Bowles, "Aggregation of Labor Inputs in the 
Study of Growth and Planning Experiences with Two-Level CES 
Functions," Journ. of Political Economy, LXXVIII, 68-81 
(January-February, 1970). 
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theorems have been developed that show a one-to-one corre­
spondence between specified and quantified cost functions and 
the unspecified production functions which serve as their 
basis.^ In this methodology, only the cost or profit functions 
of the firm are specified, with the demands for inputs derived 
directly from these (rather than from production functions). 
The estimated demand functions provide the coefficients which 
yield the elasticities of substitution between factors 
2 directly. To some extent, this process simply substitutes 
the difficulty of specifying and quantifying cost functions 
for those associated with production functions. The process 
does, however, avoid the need to assume profit maximization as 
a producer motivation; an assumption that is usually made when 
deriving input-demand and commodity-supply functions from pro­
duction functions. 
In summary, then, there has been considerable theoretical 
and quantitative study of income distribution as it is reflected 
in factor share movements. The question posed in this study, 
^R. W. Shephard, Cost and Production Functions (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1953). D. McFadden, "Uost, 
Revenue, and Profit Functions." Working Paper 86, IBER 
(Berkeley, 1966). W, E. Diewert, "An Application of the 
Shephard Duality Theorem: A Generalized Leontief Production 
Function," Report 6921, CMSBE, University of Chicago (Chicago: 
June, 1966) . 
2 See, as an example, R. W. Parks, "Price Responsiveness of 
Factor Utilization in Swedish Manufacturing 1870-1950," Rev. of 
Economics and Statistics, LII, 129-39 (1971). 
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however, is whether knowledge of changing relative factor 
shares gives reliable guidance if concern is with the changes 
in individuals' relative incomes. 
3. Factor shares and individual's income 
Some doubt can be cast on the power of factor share 
analysis as a basis for drawing inferences for individual's 
income as a result of a brief demonstration. Let there be 3 
individuals and 3 factors. The income of an individual (Yj) is 
the summed product of the i factor service rates (r's), and the 
quantities of services sold (a's). This is shown in Equation 
1.1.^ The factor share (S^) is the specific factor service rate 
times the sum of the services sold by all j persons, shown in 
Equation 1.2. 
1.1) Y. = Z r. a. . 
J i ^ 
1.2) S. = r. Z a.. 
j 
The relative factor share of a factor with respect to another 
would be the ratio of "S's", and the relative income of one 
family with respect to another is the ratio of "Y's". 
^This assumes that the factor receives its marginal value 
product as the rate of return per unit. 
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In the expository example, the factor share of factor 1 
relative to factor 2 is shown in Equation 1.3 
The income position of individual 1 relative to individual 2 
is shown in Equation 1.4 
For a change on S^/Sg to imply the exact direction and 
extent of change in Y^/Yg, regardless of whether the initial 
change in factor shares was the result of price movement, 
quantity movement, or a combination, only a^^^^ and 322 can be 
non-zero. This is comparable to a simplified case in which 
each individual sells one and only one factor service. 
For a change in S^/Sg to imply the direction of the change 
of not the extent, the income earned in market 1 by 
individual 1 would have to dominate all other contributing 
income streams as a whole, as shown in Equation 1.5 
A similar state would be demanded for individual 2; that is 
income from factor 2 would have to dominate his income. 
1.3) fl ^  ^ l|^ll ^12 ^13^ 
^2 ^2(^21 ^22 •*" ^23^ 
1.4) 
^ ^ (^1*11 + 22*21 + =3*31) 
^2 (^1*12 ^2*22 ^3*32^ 
1.5) 
^1^11 ^ (^2*21 ^3^31) 
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If these conditions were not met there are only weak 
inferences to be drawn for individuals from factor share 
movements. 
C. Plan of the Study 
A model is developed in Chapter II that directly relates 
technical change to the distribution of income among individ­
uals (and groups of individuals). It does not depend on prior 
knowledge of factor share movements; rather it is based on a 
hypothesized system through which it is supposed that an 
individual satisfies his welfare needs as a participant in an 
economy. 
Subsequent chapters, II and III, quantify the model and 
demonstrate its use in the analysis of the impacts of technical 
change in a district agricultural economy of India. Chapter V 
contains suggestions for and illustrates introductory use of 
the model in further quantitative policy research. 
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II. A MODEL OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION 
BY SIZE-CLASS 
The development of the model begins with the definition of 
a simple system, depicting the behavior of an individual as he 
attempts to satisfy his welfare needs as a participant in an 
economy. His participation involves his selling factor 
services, consuming goods and services (including the service 
flows derived from his accumulated stock of consumer durables), 
patronizing public goods and experiencing externalities. His 
preference function is subsumed in the analysis, but the system 
is not fully positive since the parameters do not depict the 
quantitatively revealed behavior of a given individual or 
group. Factor service markets are also assumed to be present, 
but they are not specified. 
The impact of a technical change for an individual can be 
viewed in this system. Further, it becomes clear, that several 
of the system's arguments are (or could be) policy instruments. 
This is consistent with the view that whatever the "natural" 
impact of technical change for the individual, there is 
opportunity for governments to modify it; likewise it is con­
sistent with the view that policy decisions can have roughly 
the same impact on individual wellbeing as natural technical 
19 
changes.^ 
However, the problems associated with changing technology, 
are more frequently stated in terms of who are the relative 
"gainers" and " losers rather than in terms of the absolute 
change in any given individual's welfare status. The model to 
evaluate this differentiated impact of technical change is 
composed of the welfare derivation systems of several indi­
viduals '. Technical changes are thus viewed as changing 
several individual's welfare states simultaneously. A mathe­
matical programming statement of the overall model is given to 
accommodate the simultaneous nature of the problem, and to 
ensure consistent projection. 
As a prelude to its demonstration in use, the model is 
restated in terms ammenable to quantification, although the 
development of the model is expressed in purely theoretical 
terms. 
A. Technical Change and Individual Wellbeing 
In an abstract framework, not intended for quantification, 
a given individual (and his family) derive satisfaction, W, in 
^For an analysis of the impacts of technical change and 
policy in American agriculture see Luther Tweeten and Dean 
Schreiner, "Impact of Public Policy and Technical Change on 
Marginal Farms and on the Non-Farm Rural Population," in 
Benefits and Burdens of Rural Development, Center for Agri-
cultural and Rural Development (Ames: Iowa State University, 
1970} 41-76. 
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a given period, from a host of factor-service selling activi­
ties , consumption activities, and activities of participation 
in public goods. For the moment, subscripts designating time-
period and individual are omitted. 
1. A simple model of individual wellbeing 
Let column vectors be designated as 
C - a (ixl) vector of goods and services consumed (flows), 
G - a (kxl) vector of flows from public goods, 
q - a (rxl) vector of factor-service flows derived from 
set of owned resources, g*, 
I(t_m) ~ & (jxl) vector of possible current consumption 
flows from stocks of consumer durables of 
average age "in'', 
q* - a (j*xl) vector of possible investment goods, 
(stocks) including human capital and consumer 
durables which could be acquired in the 
current time. It is also the vector of cur­
rently owned capital stock from which q and 
I(t_m) flow. Aq* is a vector of investment, 
that is a change in the capital stock. 
Tr - a (sxl) vector of income flows as transfer payments. 
Let row vectors be designated as 
a - a (Ixi) vector of marginal propensities to derive 
utility from the goods and service flows 
consumed. 
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(Ixk) vector of marginal propensities to derive 
utility from public good flows, 
(Ixi) vector of marginal propensities to consume 
out of current income (where income has both 
a permanent and transitory component), 
(Ixi) vector or marginal propensities to consume 
out of transfer payments, y* would differ 
from Y in that it would be heavily weighted 
towards necessity items, with small magnitudes 
for the items that the individual views as 
luxuries, 
(Ixr) vector of factor—service prices received net 
of taxes, so that p^ = P^(l - Tx^). (p^ is 
the unit price received and Tx^ is the unit 
tax on factor "r".) The elements could be 
viewed as fixed for the individual if he was 
viewed as being a perfect competitor in factor 
service markets, or be linked with the vector 
q so that both p and q were simultaneously 
determined. For convenience, however, let p 
be a set of given constants for the individual. 
(Ixj) vector of marginal propensities to consume out 
of the permanent income flows from consumer 
durables, 
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Ç - a (Ixs) vector of units or zeros, depending upon which 
forms of transfer payment the individual 
receives. A vector of zeros indicates that 
the individual receives no transfer payments. 
In a more elaborate scheme, there could be a 
set of conditional logic specified that linked 
the levels of p, g, and Tr through the vector 
S. Alternatively, a vector Ç* could be 
specified the elements of which would vary as 
the levels of varied to different degrees 
below target levels. However, the simpler 
specification is retained here for convenience. 
S - a (Ixj*) vector of marginal propensities to spend on 
capital stock items, q* including human 
capital and consumer durables. 
The scalars in the system are. 
W - the level of utility experienced by the individual 
and his family 
- income available for current consumption 
Y - total income including permanent and transitory 
components 
A - amount of income allocated to purchase capital stock 
items 
Tr - amount of transfer payment income received 
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E - a factor which increases or decreases current 
utility by virtue of the individual's experiencing 
external effects from his community. 
Using these definitions. Equation 2.1 shows the individual 
deriving utility from consumed goods and services, public goods 
and externalities. Equation 2.2 shows the individual's con­
suming out of currently disposable income and transfer payments. 
Equation 2.3 indicates the allocation of total income between 
current consumption and re-investment. Equation 2.4 defines 
the allocation for re-investment, as a function of income. 
Equation 2.5 shows income as a flow derived from the current 
sale of factor services and from consumer durables, and Equa­
tion 2.6 defines transfer payment income as being derived from 
participation in possible welfare programs. A simplified form 
of the system expressing W in terms of the activities of the 
individual is given as Equation 2.7. It is derived after 
substitution^ and simplification. 
2.1) W = aC + a*G + E 
2.2) C = 
2.3) Yg = Y - A 
2.4) A = Z & q*.*; Aq* = 6'Y 
J* ^ 
Substitute from Equations 2.4 and 2.5 into 2.3; 2.3 and 
2.6 into 2.2; 2.2 into 2.1. 
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2.5) Y = pg + 
2.6) Tr = ÇTr 
2.7) W = ay'pq + ay'nl^t-m) + a*G + E - ay'A 
The system subsumes a preference function whose parameters 
would be the rate of deriving utility from flows of goods and 
services, a; the intertemporal consumption preferences in ô; 
and the rates of possible disutility from offering factor 
services. In its reduced form, the model shows that the indi­
vidual might derive utility at different rates from different 
sources of income, depending on how he consumed out of differ­
ent income flows.^ Further, the model allows the individual 
to view income flows as non-perfect substitutes for each other 
i n  s a t i s f y i n g  w e l f a r e  n e e d s  [ s i n c e  i t  i s  u n l i k e l y  t h a t  a y ' p  =  
a y ' n  =  a y * ' •  
2. The impact of technical chcinge on individual wellbeing 
An abstract technical change will immediately affect the 
individual's welfare by changing the relative factor-service 
^Recent evidence indicates that there is some support for 
the hypothesis that individuals demonstrate different consump­
tion behavior when spending income derived from labor wages, 
capital lending or permanent sources. Robert Holbrook and 
Frank Stafford, The Propensity to Consume Separate Tyyes of 
Income; A Generalized Permanent Income Hypothesis, Michigan 
Research Paper 1, University of Michigan (Ann Arbor: University 
of Michigan, May 1968). 
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productivities, and so the relative prices paid. The individual 
will gain income to the extent that he sells the favored 
factor-service and lose income to the extent that he sells the 
other factor services. He will also gain to the extent that he 
can sell more of some factor services (if he has them to sell) 
and lose to the extent that factor substitution in production 
reduces demands for factor services he might have sold. The 
resulting change in welfare will be the change in income flows 
from different sources modified by the individual's consumption 
out of different income flows and the utility derived from the 
goods and services so consumed. 
Over time, the individual's sustained welfare would change 
to the extent that he was encouraged to adjust his asset 
holdings (that is, make adjustments in q*). These portfolio 
changes would be conditioned, however, by the individual's 
intertemporal consumption desires.^ Changes in the tax 
structure could alter the fSctor prices received for the factor 
service sales, and transfer payment programs could supplement 
income if instituted. The welfare derived from these changes 
would, again, be modified by the preferences of the individual 
for the goods and services these income flows support. 
^Added constraints to capital stock adjustment not speci­
fied but presumably influencing the vector 5, are constraints 
inçosed by law, by the degree of divisibility in the asset, or 
by the price per salaible unit of asset in relation to 
individual's debt capacity and income. 
26 
Variation in government offerings of public goods, or welfare 
programs would also modify individual wellbeing. 
If the individual owned only one type of capital and 
offered only one factor service for sale, it would be relatively 
simple to predict the direction (and possibly the extent) of 
the change in his absolute level of wellbeing. The change he 
experienced following the technical change, would be that 
experienced by the factor he sold. But if he sells more than 
one factor service, the net change in income (and thus, welfare) 
would be known only after an empirical investigation of the 
individual's situation before and after the technical change. 
Moreover, even if the individual initially sold only one type 
of factor service, the possibility that he could alter his 
capital stock and begin to sell other factor services means 
that empirical investigation would be needed to indicate the 
changes in his income and welfare overtime. 
B. Technical Change and Relative Wellbeing 
It would be feasible (assuming that a measurement of wel­
fare were available) to develop a reduced form equation like 
Equation 2.7 for each participant in the economy to actually 
work out the gains or losses to each, as technology changed. 
However, the cost of such universal inclusion of individuals 
would be large considering the possibility of gaining similar 
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estimates of impact (with only slightly less probability of 
being "correct") by considering near-homogeneous groups instead. 
1. Aggregation 
A consistent^ aggregation could be made by specifying 
class marks so as to minimize the variance within a group 
and maximize the differences between groups. Moreover, the 
bounds of consistency depend to a large extent, on the problem 
to be analysed, and the intended use of the analysis. If con­
cern was with the impacts of technical change (or any change 
for that matter) on individuals with different levels of income 
and welfare, aggregation would tend to be consistent if low 
income persons were aggregated together regardless of the 
factor services sold or assets held. In the present analysis 
it is assumed that individuals have been grouped into con­
sistent classes with the object of highlighting the similari­
ties in their current income levels (where current indicates 
the state before the technical change). 
^An aggregation is said to be "consistent" if information 
of a more detailed nature than the aggregation at hand, would 
not add to the accuracy of the result of the analysis being 
performed. See H. A. John Green, Aggregation in Economic 
Analysis: An Introductory Survey (Princeton: Frinceton 
University Press, 1964) p. 3; Henri Thexl, Economics and 
Information Theory (Amsterdam: North-Holland"Publishing Co., 
1967) p. 322 and chapter 2. For examples in application see 
Earl O. Heady and Wilfred Candler, Linear Programming Methods 
(Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1958) pp. 215-18. 
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Let the groups of families formed in the aggregation sell 
their factor services and buy the goods and services from which 
they derive utility, in markets that are linked through effec­
tive arbitrage. Further, let all participants buy new 
productive assets in capital stock markets that are similarly 
linked. Therefore, relative price movements are the same for 
all, even though absolute prices may differ owing to differ­
ences in monopoly or monopsony power. If all families are in 
perfect competition, even the absolute prices would be the 
same. All individuals would be faced with changes in factor 
demands and changing relative real factor-service prices simul­
taneously. A model now needs to be stated for measuring the 
differential impacts of technological change on the welfare 
positions of grouped individuals, when these changes simul­
taneously confront all groups. 
2. Model of relative group wellbeing 
Assume that all factor owners (as represented in their 
groups) attempt to maximize the value of their perceived wel­
fare functions subject to constraints imposed by their own 
stock of capital, their tastes and preferences, the perceived 
relative prices of commodities and prices of factors services 
sold, and the activities of others buying and selling in the 
same markets. In a sense, the groups are in competition for 
the welfare that the economy has to offer. The problem of 
several groups attempting to simultaneously maximize their own 
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welfare under these conditions then appears ammenable to 
analysis in a programming framework. 
The objective function of the economy when depicted as a 
program would be the simple unit-weighted sum of "n" group's 
welfare.^ Being unit-weighted, an increase in welfare would 
be of equal value, regardless of the group that experienced 
the gain. This would be consistent with a notion that the 
economy under laissez-faire does not set a priori preferences 
for the wellbeing of specified groups but rather is impartially 
with respect to individuals and groups of them. An assumption 
that group welfare functions are independent would not be 
vital in this model since interdependencies could be included 
in specification of constraints. 
Assuming "n" groups in the economy, Equation set 2.8 
depicts the welfare maximization problem stated from the 
2 
resource-owner's viewpoint. 
^If there are "1" individuals in group "n", the welfare of 
group "n", W^, would be the sum of individual welfares, = 
Z where is given in Equation 2.7 (recalling that sub­
scripts had been omitted there). 
2 This is a simplification for the sake of exposition here. 
In an enlarged study one could include a detailed specification 
of the production side, linking this with the distribution of 
resources among groups of individuals so that the variables 
assumed to be exogenous in this statement would be endogenized. 
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Maximize: Z = c'W c = (1, 
W = (W^, W2/...,W^) 
where; = (a , a*)^, for the nth group 
2.8) 
subject to: 0z - R z = (z,/ z^/.-.fZ-) for the nth 
group. 
z — 0 
The variables in the model are now described briefly. 
Parenthetically, the transformation between the nth classes' 
activities, z^, and W^, the nth classes' welfare, is included 
simply to emphasize the point that the economy would operate 
so as to impartially and impersonally maximize total welfare, 
W (hence the vector of units placed where prices enter a 
standard program, c). In fact, a more operational statement 
would be that the economy seeks to maximize the welfare value 
of all the activities of all the groups simultaneously, that 
is, Z = pz where p = (p^, P2/ — ,p^^. 
a) Activities, z: The column vector, z, is a vector of 
class-specific activity vectors such that z = (z^, Zgf.'.fZ^). 
For the nth class, 2^ = (g^, I(t.-m)n' ^^n' ^ n^ ' that is, it is 
a vector of inflow activities contributing to the individual's 
welfare as defined for Equation 2.7. There are Z (r^ + + 
n 
s_ + activities in Z. 
n n 
b) Resource constraints, R: The "right-hand-side", R, is 
a column vector of class-specific resource vectors, q*, and 
includes two columns Tr* and G* depicting the stock from which 
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the s transfer payments and k public goods are derived through 
public policy, g* is the stock from which the activities of 
factor-service sale and consumption of part of the indi­
vidual's permanent income I(t-m)n derived. There are j* 
entries in each R sub-vector. The inclusion of resources of 
n 
the economy generating transfer and public good flows as 
separate stock vectors indicates that all individuals would 
draw on the common flows Tr and G, so that there would be an 
element of competition between groups for the scarce flows 
available. There are conceptually, as many as (s+k) such 
economy-wide resources. 
The vector R has a maximum ofZj*+s+k entries. If 
n 
each group owns the same generic type of resource, there is a 
maximum of nj * + s + k elements. 
c) Matrix of input-output coefficients 0 :  The matrix of 
input-output coefficients, J?, will have a dimension of 
Z j* + s + k by Z (i + s)^; or, which is the same thing, 
n n 
Z j * + s + k b y Z  ( r + j + s + k )  . ^  T h e  i n t e r n a l  s t r u c t u r e  
n n 
^Equation 2.7 shows that since the income flows are spent 
on the acquisition of consumer goods and services, from which 
utility is derived, (i+s)^ = (r+j+k+s)^. If each class held 
generically identical resources and consumed a generically 
standard set of goods and services, the dimensions of 0 would 
be nj* + s + k by n(i+s). 
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of 0 will vary, depending on the assumptions that are made con­
cerning the allocation of income to various alternate consump­
tion possibilities. In general, the matrix will have a block-
diagonal configuration, as illustrated in Figure 2.1. The 
figure is considerably simplified in its detail, employing the 
notations of the algebraic development in a preceding section 
of this chapter. 
In the unlikely event however, that there was one-to-one 
relationship between income flows of different types and items 
of current consumption, 0 would become perfectly diagonal 
(except for the coefficients transforming flows from Tr* and 
G* into class-specific utility). 
3. Impacts of technical change on relative wellbeing 
A set of impacts result from technical change that are 
qualitatively similar to those discussed in the context of the 
individual. But in the present case, the impacts are experi­
enced by "n" groups simultaneously so that a change in the 
absolute level of wellbeing of any group represents a change 
in relative wellbeing between groups. 
The immediate impact of the technical change would be to 
change relative factor productivities, with a resultant change 
in relative factor-service prices (assuming markets that are 
reasonably free of imperfections). In the context of equation 
set 2.8, this would be represented by a change in some of the 
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elements of 0; namely the factor prices, p, for each group of 
participants that sell the factor service involved. An alter­
nate interpretation of the impact of change would be that it 
changes the relative effective availability of capital stock 
items. This represents a change in the structure of R. 
If more than one group of individuals sells the factor 
services involved, or own the items of capital influenced by 
the technical change, the resulting distribution of welfare 
among groups would be difficult to determine, except through 
quantitative experimentation.^ In the event that each group 
sold one and only one factor service, and owned one and only 
one type of capital, however, relative group welfare would 
change in the direction and extent of changed factor shares. 
Over time, the predictability of the relative welfare 
outcome of technical change would decrease further, even with 
the assumption of one-factor-groups. In the longer run, 
individuals in groups could alter the composition of its asset 
holdings, leading to further restructuring of R. With a 
^This conclusion parallels a standard conclusion in con­
ventional programming; that a change in the optimal mix or 
levels of activities following a change in resource constraints 
or technical coefficients is not generally predictable a priori. 
In the present model, the mix of activities would represent the 
various activities of the groups, and the levels would be the 
amounts of utility derived from the activities. 
2 This is the same conclusion stated in Chapter I. Recall 
that in this case, the one-factor-group assumption would lead 
to a diagonal matrix. 
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restructured asset base, the set of alternative activities for 
the satisfaction of welfare needs could also change (being 
incorporated into the model by adding .or deleting elements in 
q , or I,. . Perceived differences in the availability of 
^n (t-m)n 
consumably commodities or services following the technical 
change could lead individuals to adjust their consumption pat­
terns, which would be reflected in changes in p, or y. 
Increased or decreased participation in transfer payment pro­
grams over time would be reflected in changes in Ç. 
In this longer run, therefore, in the absence of govern­
ment policy changes (which would be incorporated in changes in 
G* or Tr*) the distribution of welfare among groups would 
again become a matter for empirical determination. 
C. Technical Change and Relative Income 
The discussion up to this point has been in terms and 
relationships that would not generally lend themselves to 
quantification. Because the determination of the changes 
caused by technical change appears to be an empirical question 
however, translation of the model into quantifiable terms is 
necessary if further analysis is to be considered. 
With the assumption that maximizing income^ is a 
necessary precondition for maximizing welfare, the system 
^The appropriate measure of income is discussed in Chapter 
III. 
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depicted in Equations 2.1 through 2.7 is reconsidered. 
Simplifications of the individual's system that would be con­
sistent with the assumption that income precedes welfare 
attainment would include 
a) a removal of the specification of the individual's 
consumption behavior 
b) removal of the specification of the determinants of 
investment (although in application, amounts allocated 
for reinvestment would be identified so they are not 
classified as satisfying current utility needs) 
c) removal of the specification of the propensity to 
participate in public goods, and experience 
externalities. 
The specification of the receipts of transfer payments, would 
be retained since the individual could still use this form of 
income to satisfy welfare needs (even though he might not view 
transfers as perfect substitutes for earned income). However, 
the value of the individual's (and so a group's) income could 
be raised indefinitely through transfer payments. Therefore, 
transfers are included in the revised system under a rule that 
prevents the payment of transfers except to fill a gap between 
earned and some pre-determined target income for the group. 
In a laissez-faire economy, the target income would be zero. 
A further assumption is that the value of r) is estimated 
by the rental price of the service of the durable good. In 
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the revised system, therefore, a vector of values received, 
p'', includes the prices, p, received from the sale of factor 
services and the values of estimated n. 
Equation set 2.9 describes the income maximization system 
for the economy. 
Maximize A=cY c=(l,l,...,l) 
y = (Y^, Y2,...,Y^) 
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The parameters in the system have been defined in this 
chapter, with the exception of the matrix of coefficients B. 
The matrix B is block-diagonal, as was the matrix Çf. However, 
the non-zero elements of B would be units throughout, so that 
the matrix simply serves as a transfer medium for assigning 
flows of factor-service and transfer payments to the markets 
in which the groups of individuals participate. 
All parameters in equation set 2.9 can be quantified, so 
that the model in this form could be applied to determine the 
impacts of technical change on relative income levels of dif­
ferent groups in the economy. If the n groups are formed to 
highlight the differences in the size of their incomes, the 
model will show the impacts of technical change on the size-
distribution of income. 
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III. AN EXAMPLE OF THE MODEL IN OPERATION: 
INITIAL FORM AND APPLICATION 
The desire to consider the welfare of several groups in a 
simultaneous analysis, to identify the size-distributional 
impacts of technical change, motivated the use of mathematical 
programming as a means of stating the problem. This chapter 
contains the quantification of the size-distribution model 
stated at the end of the preceeding chapter. 
A. An Illustrative Economy 
The Muzaffar-Nagar district of Uttar Pradesh in India's 
wheat growing region, experienced the introduction of high 
yielding varieties in the 1965-66 growing season. This 
district was not a participant in the planned intensive agri­
cultural development program^ of the Government of India, so 
that the introduction and adoption of the new seeds and 
methods, since then, can be considered as approximating a 
natural and evolutionary spread of technological change. 
^See Government of India, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, 
Expert Committee on Assessment and Evaluation, Modernizing 
Indian Agriculture: A Report on the Intensive Agricultur­
al District Program, Volume II, TNew Delhi: author, 1970; for 
a list of the I.A.D.P. districts. 
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The Muzaffar-Nagar district lies in the extreme north-west part 
of the state, so that it can be considered a primarily wheat-
growing region, even though Uttar Pradesh produces as much rice 
as wheat. 
1. The economy in context 
In the 1954-57 period, a typical farm in Muzaffar-Nagar 
district contained 4.16 hectares^(about 6 acres) of which 80 
percent was irrigated, had a cropping intensity of 137 (a crop­
ping intensity of 100 indicates that one crop per growing 
season is obtained), and cultivated 71 percent of the land in 
food crops. These average magnitudes indicate that farms in 
the district were in the near median position with respect to 
the 13 districts in other 7 states covered in the original 
Studies. 
In the district, farms generally were operated by families 
with about 7 members (including permanent servants) who owned 
2.5 draught animals and who generally relied on a market for 
inputs (since there was a relatively high proportion of paid-
^The data in this and the following paragraphs are 
from Government of India, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, 
Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Farm Management in 
India (New Delhi, author, 1966). This document contains a 
synopsis of the findings of the 14 district-wise Government of 
India, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Directorate of 
Economics and Statistics, Studies in the Economics of Farm 
Management (The Studies) conducted over the years 1954-62 
which were based on cost accounting surveys of a representative 
sample of farms (in a variety of states). 
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out expenses in cash and kind to total expenses including 
imputed expenses; 71 percent in Muzaffar-Nagar compared with 
an all-India high of 82 percent and a low of 35 percent). 
Farms in the district enjoyed relative prosperity compared to 
other districts in the 1954-62 years with net incomes in cash 
and kind of about Rs. 260 per hectare compared with an all-
India a high of Rs. 324 and a low of Rs. 64. This represented 
about 1.94 of the paid-out expenses. As an indication of 
profitability, farms in the district showed a ratio of output 
to total expenses (including imputed labor, land and capital 
costs) of 1.26 compared to a high of 1.41 and a low of 0-25. 
The district was not the most prosperous, most profitable, or 
most advanced in India. It was, however, one of the districts 
in which the coming of the "green revolution" in wheat altered 
the production structure. The changes are now discussed 
further. 
2. Economic changes over a decade 
Over the decade between 19 54-57 and 1968-69, that is, 
between the times that the Muzaffar-Nagar district first came 
under survey as part of the Studies and a more recent 
survey, several changes have occurred, the impetus for which 
can be attributed to the "green revolution" in wheat produc­
tion. Although average farm size has remained about the same, 
farm business income has grown considerably on both the per-
farm and per-hectare basis. The growth indicated in Table 3.1, 

































































































Farm business income is the value of total output at market prices (received or 
imputed) less the total paid out expense in cash or kind. In effect it is the return 
to owned land, owned capital and family labor. 
^1954-57 averages estimated from Government of India, Ministry of Food and Agri­
culture, Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Studies in the Economics of Farm 
Management, Uttar Pradesh, 19 54-55, 19 55-56, and 1956-57. (New Delhi; author, ÏF58, 
1959, 1960). 
^1968-69 averages from Government of India, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, 
Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Studies in the Economics of Farm Management, 
Uttar Pradesh, 1968-69, Part II, Tables (New Delhi ; unpublished, 1971). 
'^Change is the ratio of 1968-69 estimate to 1954-57 estimate. 
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is growth in tejnns of market prices, but real growth is still 
impressive, even allowing for a general rise in prices of about 
68 percent between 1960-61 and 1967-68.^ In addition, however, 
there was a general growth in income disparities in farming, 
both in terms of the gap relative to the families operating 
the smallest farms (the under 2.02 hectare farms) and the 
disparity between the farm generated incomes of other farm 
size-groups. 
Some caution should be used in drawing the inference that 
the growing divergence between the farm business incomes of 
small and large farm-operating families signals an equal di­
vergence in family welfares. Typically, for small farm oper­
ators, at least, some off-farm employment supplements family 
2 income which is not included as farm business income. Never­
theless, the divergence exhibited is an indicator of a trend 
that would be expected to continue;^ namely, that the income 
^See V. M. Dandekar and Nilakantha Rath, Poverty in India 
(New Delhi: Ford Foundation, December, 1970) pp. 32-33. 
2 Government of India, Farm Management..., Appendix Table 
II (b), p. 99, shows the farm with under 1.01 hectare having 
about 36 days employment off the holding. 
model showing the continued growth in income dispari­
ties among farm-operating families as a result of simple profit 
maximizing behavior and resource acquisition is contained in 
Uma K. Srivastava, Robert W. Crown and Earl 0. Heady, 
"Green Revolution and Farm Income Distribution," Economic and 
Political Weekly, VI, No. 52, Review of Agriculture, 
A-163—A-172 (Bombay: December^ 1971). 
45 
earned from farming is likely to have an increasingly skewed 
distribution among farm-operating families, in favor of 
operators of larger farms. 
Changes in resource ownership and employment have occurred 
simultaneously with the changes in absolute and relative income 
(see Table 3.2). In the context of the programming framework 
given in Chapter II, these changes can be viewed as changes in 
the vector of constraints "R". Although relatively small 
shifts have occurred with respect to average size of operational 
holding, the asset value of land has risen dramatically as a 
result of the increased output potential of the H.Y.V. wheats. 
This indicates growth in the rental value of land, although 
"rent" is not explicitly given in the table. 
Of equal interest is the change in the structure of 
employment that has corresponded to the change in land produc­
tivity. Employment of family labor on farms has declined for 
all farm size-classes, on both per-farm and per-hectare bases. 
In contrast, there has been a large increase in the employment 
of hired labor per-farm on large farms, with an absolute 
decline on small farms. Further, on the per-hectare basis, 
employment of hired labor has increased on larger farms and 
remained about constant on smaller farms. These tendencies 
indicate the possibility that labor formerly employed on 
smaller farms (both family and hired labor) in the 1954-57 
period has found some new employment on large farms in the 
Table 3.2. Resource employment by farm size-class 1954-57 and 1968-69, Muzaffar-Nagar 
Item Farm size-class 
(hectares) 
Under 2.02 4.04 6.06 Over 
2.02 -4.03 -6.05 -8.07 8.09 
Family 54-57* 457.9 639.4 604.9 904.9 980.0 
fSm^ 68-69^ 164.0 333. 5 357. 3 421.6 583.0 
(days) Change^ 0.36 0.52 0.59 0.47 0.60 
Family 54-57 431.7 207.6 123.5 132.3 87.7 
h^ctare^^ 68-69 132.2 109.0 72.3 57.6 45.9 
(days) Change 0.39 0.53 0.59 0.44 0.52 
Hired 54-57 33.3 76.5 115.5 164.1 208.5 
68-69 18.6 60.0 156.9 280.7 514.5 
(days) Change 0.56 0.79 1.37 1.71 2.48 
Hired 54-57 14.7 14.8 14.2 14.3 11.2 
hectare^^ 68-69 15.0 19.6 32.0 38.4 40.5 


















Change 2.03 2.44 1.71 3.11 3.11 
Value of 54-57 2,004.05 1,779.19 2 ,036.18 2,016.41 2 ,710.79 
land per 
hectare 68-69 5,914.57 5,511.08 6 ,835.16 7,294.57 6 ,783.96 
(Rs.) Change 2.95 3.09 3.36 3.62 2.50 
1954-57 averages estimated from Government of India, Ministry of Food and Agri­
culture, Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Studies, in the Economics of Farm 
Management, Uttar Pradesh, 1954-55, 1955-56, and 1956-57 (New Delhi; author, 1958, 
1959, 1960). 
^1968-69 averages from Government of India, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, 
Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Studies in the Economics of Farm Management, 
Uttar Pradesh, 1968-69, Part II, Tables (New Delhi : unpublished, 1971). 
^Change is the ratio of 1968-69 estimate to 1954-57 estimate. 
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post-green revolution period (assuming a constant or growing 
labor force). A reasonable view would be that the decreased 
family labor input simultaneous with increased hired labor 
input on large farms signals growing leisure-taking or off-farm 
employment for members of these farm families. As a general 
tendency, however, there seems to be fewer labor days employed 
per hectare in the 1968-69 period. 
The capital stock per hectare has increased for all farms. 
This would be consistent with a hypothesis that successful 
production of H.Y.V. wheats requires a minimum level of new 
fixed capital (essentially a minimum capital stock regardless 
of farm size), and that it has been profitab.a for even small-
sized farms to make this minimum acquisition. However, there 
has been a change in the level of capital per hectare on large 
with respect to small farms over the decade. In the fifties, 
before the green revolution, it was apparent that the invest­
ment per hectare and farm size were inversely related. This 
indicates that under the technical production function of that 
day, it required relatively little capital to exhaust that 
factor's positive marginal value product,^ 
^One hypothesis links the low marginal value of capital to 
growth in land values over the decade. When capital was at the 
zero-marginal value point surplus income was used to speculate 
in land; both in a desire to raise total income (assuming con­
stant returns to scale) and to acquire status, and an inflation-
proof savings form. See Profulla C. Sarkar, The Planning of 
Agriculture in India (Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press, 
1966) . 
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After the change in production possibilities in the mid-sixties, 
however, it has become increasingly profitable to acquire and 
employ capital. Further, since larger farms would not be as 
constrained in their capital acquisitions by income and credit 
restraints as small farms, they would have added more capital 
relative to their former positions than small farmers. 
In general, therefore, in the largest farms, the 300 per­
cent indicated increase in capital (even allowing for price 
rises) has occurred simultaneously with a 14 percent increase 
in land area and a moderate decline in labor input per hectare. 
For the 6.06-8.07 hectare class, a 300 percent growth in 
capital per hectare has accompanied a 7 percent increase in 
average farm size and a 41 percent decline in per-hectare 
employment. For the 4.04-6.05 hectare class, the 2.02-4.03 
hectare class and the under 2.02 hectare class, the increases 
in capital stock have been less pronounced, with constant or 
declining average farm size, and a reduction in employment per 
hectare of 24 percent, 42 percent and 51 percent respectively. 
Thus there has been a tendency, over the decade, for change to 
be relatively labor saving (but not necessarily employment 
reducing). 
A model which indicated the general continuance of these 
tendencies when quantified with reasonably estimated param­
eters would probably be more believable than one that did not. 
Auxiliary results and conclusions drawn from a model that was 
consistent with these tendencies would also be reliable. The 
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task for the remainder of this chapter is to make a reasonably 
approximate quantification of the "quantifiable" model pre­
sented in Chapter II. 
B. The Model As Applied 
One convenience of applying the model to an agricultural 
economy, is that within families and groups of families there 
are both sales options open for the marketing of factor 
services outside the family and the possibilities of marketing 
factor services through home production activities. New pro­
duction possibilities can, therefore, be explicitly stated as 
activities, as they might be viewed from resource-owners' 
standpoint. Further a round of explicit assumptions as to 
factor productivities, factor service prices and barriers to 
competition can be avoided. 
Data depicting the structure of the economy as it has most 
recently appeared (1968-69) are used to quantify the initial 
or "pre-technological-change" model. This is a second-best 
approach, the most desirable situation being one in which the 
model is quantified before the technical change actually 
occurred and re-run after the technical change, when changes 
in production possibilities, factor availabilities, or selected 
input-output coefficients indicating the advent of the change 
are present. 
51 
However, the second-best approach is acceptable in an 
analysis involving the green revolution, 
since a) there is no apparently clear-cut date on which 
technical change can be said to have occurred; 
rather, there is a period over which the technical 
change gradually became accepted and implemented.^ 
b) producer behavior exhibited in the future would 
probably be based on a set of relative prices, per­
ceptions of profitability, expectations and 
aspirations common with those that followed the 1966 
introduction of H.Y.V.'s therefore, that information 
from an earlier time would not add to the reliability 
of predicted behavior. 
c) the income distribution is already known for a time 
in which the technical change was in wide applica­
tion; that is, the 1968-69 period, so that earlier 
observations would be redundant. 
and d) as a result of knowing a current structure of the 
sector and a concurrent income distribution, along 
with a likely set of producer behavioral relation­
ships , predictions of future income distributions 
should be possible without resort to data from a 
more historic past. 
This will be the basis of the research strategy in the remainder 
of this study. 
1. Restatement of the model 
The problem faced in the economy under the assumption that 
the income of all participants taken together is maximized. 
In 1966, only 3,000 of the 12.6 million hectares under 
wheat cultivation in India were in high yielding varieties. 
But, by 1968 3 million of the 15 million hectares in wheat were 
allocated to H.Y.V.'s. The area increased to 6 million out of 
a possible 16 million hectares by 1970. United States Depart­
ment of Agriculture, High Yielding Varieties of Wheat in 
Developing Countries, ERS-F-322 (Washington, D.C., author, 1972) 
Table 2 ,  p .  T l  
52 
without regard for individuals or specific persons is restated 
here as equation set 3.1. 
3.1) 
Maximize A = cY C — ( I f  
Y = (Y^, 






+ Ç Tr for the nth group 
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T  
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The model is now respecified in terms appropriate for 
application to the agricultural economy of Muzaffar-Nagar. 
Several simplifications are assumed in the redefinition of the 
variables, however, the essential features of the theoretical 
model of Chapter II are retained. 
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a. Basis for aggregation The problem as stated in 
equation set 3.1, is defined for "n" groups of individuals; 
each group formed so as to minimize the differences between the 
included individuals in an attempt to ensure a consistent 
aggregation. In this application, the concern is with the 
impacts of technical change (the advent of the green revolu­
tion) on the size distribution of income. Thus income deter­
mining variables are used as a basis for drawing class marks. 
The population of farm families are classified by size of farm 
holding in the current case both as a convenience (several 
sources of published data are on the farm-size basis) and in 
an attempt to draw inferences that are on a basis consistent, 
with several other policy issues of interest in Indian agri­
culture. Moreover, the use of the convenient classification by 
farm size does not invalidate inferences to income size and 
size-distribution of income changes, since there is a clearly 
non-negative relationship between the levels of per-hectare 
income and size of operational holding.^ The numbers in each 
class, the class marks, and the average size of holding in each 
class are given in Table 3.3. 
^See Table 3.1. Also see Uma K. Srivastava, Vishnuprasad 
Nagadevara, and Earl O. Heady, "Resource Productivity, Returns 
to Scale and Farm Size in Indian Agriculture: Some Further 
Evidence," Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics, (forth­
coming) in which the traditional belief in the inverse 
relationship between returns per hectare and farm size is shown 
to be no longer a correct conceptualization of agriculture in 
Uttar Pradesh. 
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Table 3.3. Distribution of sample used by size-class, 
Muzaffar-Nagar1968-69 
Class marks No. of Hectares Average 
(hectares) farms in class hectarages 
Under 2.02 17 21.09 1.24 
2.02-4.03 33 100.97 3.06 
4.04-6.05 32 158.14 4.94 
6.06-10.0 37 282.24 7.63 
Over 10.0 31 425.81 13.74 
^Government of India, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, 
Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Studies in the 
Economics of Farm Management, Uttar Pradesh, 1968-69, Part II, 
Tables (New Delhi: unpublished). 
b« Activities included In the current example, it is 
assumed that if income is maximized, the best possible set of 
preconditions exist for individuals to satisfy their welfare 
needs. The question now revolves around specifying what 
activities could yield income of the appropriate type so that 
individuals can proceed with welfare maximization on their own; 
that is defining what would constitute Y^. "Appropriate" 
income for satisfying welfare would be disposable income; that 
is, income that is already net of the costs of acquiring it. 
Ignoring several issues that could be raised concerning the 
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cost of maintaining a man or bullock in physical condition 
suitable for work, the cost of depreciation and maintenance on 
owned capital, or capital appreciation of land, income earned 
in the form of wages, interest and rents from hiring out, 
leasing out and renting out owner resources could be considered 
appropriate partial estimators of Y^. For uniformity, it is 
assumed that individuals in each size-class have the option of 
renting out land as if to a common pool, hiring out their labor 
for use by farms in any of the other size-classes, leasing out 
movable capital for use by farms in any other size-classes, and 
hiring out days of bullock power for use by others. Each size-
class, therefore, would have thirteen alternative direct factor 
service selling options open.^ In terms of the equation set 
3.1, the possibility for selling factor services to other farm 
operators would account for thirteen prices receivable in p^' 
and thirteen possible activities in q^. 
The inclusion of one option for renting out land, but 
four options for participation in labor, capital leasing, and 
bullock markets is assumed because Government of India, 
Studies...1968-69, shows that typical farm operators in each 
of the size-classes were paying for hired-in resource services 
at rates that decreased as average farm size increased. This 
could reflect differences in monopsony power, directly related 
to farm size. It shows, further, that for labor, capital, and 
bullock services, a resource owner could sell factor services 
at different rates subject to constraints imposed by demand. 
The rental value of land, in contrast, was uniform throughout 
the economy, with the rate per hectare being about 10 percent 
of the per-hectare asset value of land (rent being Rs. 600 per 
hectare). 
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In the application, individuals are permitted to market 
factor services from owned resources through the activity of 
farming,^ in competition with outright factor-service sale. 
The income contribution of this activity however, requires some 
elaboration. Total receipts (in cash and in kind) from farming 
would apparently overestimate by the amount of paid-out 
expenses that farming requires. But similarly, profit (the 
value accruing after all imputed and paid-out costs are 
deducted from total receipts) would underestimate since it 
would exclude the value of imputed wages to family labor, 
imputed rent to owned land and imputed returns to owned capital 
and bullocks which a family could use to purchase items of C or 
q*. The concept of Farm Business Income (F.B.I.) most closely 
approximates Y^ for a family (and therefore the group) since 
it is the return to the family's labor, land, capital, bullocks, 
and management (estimated as total value of output less paid 
out expenses). Its use assumes, moreover, that barter for C and 
q* is as acceptable as cash purchase, since part of the value 
The model could contain specification of several compet­
ing enterprises rather than the one net farming activity 
included here. With such an expansion, a variety of commodity-
oriented policy alternatives could be researched. But for the 
present, data were not subdivided by enterprise since this 
was not necessary in considering the measurement of impacts of 
technical change on family incomes. The use of a single farm­
ing activity assumes that farmers have already made their 
decision concerning the mix of inputs used, the amounts of 
inputs used, the mix of enterprises followed, and the levels of 
enterprises followed in accordance with their personal calculus 
of income maximization. 
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of F.B.I, (hence Y^) would be the value of income-in-kind. 
Farming would be the fourteenth income-earning activity in 
with each unit of activity adding one unit of F.B.I, as an 
element in p''. 
n 
As farming proceeds, the resources owned by farmers in a 
specific size-class might become limiting, given the value that 
the economy could realize from expanded farming operations in 
one size-class or other. There would be, therefore, advantages 
to including activities in q^ that represented the hiring-in of 
factor services. In addition to this, the inclusion of hire-in 
activities would permit a linkage between ^  ante factor 
service supply in the economy, (supply created through the 
potential for a size-class' selling factor services as income-
earning activity) and ex ante demand created if farming 
activity of one farm size-class or other was to expand. Such a 
linkage would essentially close the economy. Thus for each 
class, four additional activities are specified for inclusion 
in q^. The cost to the class of hiring in a unit of a specific 
factor service (a negative element in p/') would be identical 
to the expected income per unit to be earned by a service 
seller in another class. 
The activities involved in a group's deriving income from 
consumer durables, I(t-m)n' not explicitly stated in the 
application. Rather, the contribution of consumer durables to 
income are subsumed in the direct earnings of labor and F.B.I. 
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The assumption implicit here is that the consumer durable adds 
to the capability of the labor resource to perform the tasks 
for which it is remunerated. 
A transfer-payment-receiving activity is similarly 
excluded, on the assumption that the economy in a laissez-faire 
state assigns a zero-level target to a given individual's 
income. If policy were to be investigated in which a govern­
ment sets income targets at non-zero levels, however, explicit 
provision would have to be made for the transfer activity to 
assume a non-zero value. But policy questions are not of 
concern at the moment. 
A complete definition of and p^' is now possible for 
each group. The activities in q^ include; 
- renting out and renting in of land (2 activities) 
- leasing out of movable capital to each 
of the other groups, and the leasing 
in of capital (5 " ) 
- hiring out of labor to each of the other 
groups and the hiring in of labor (5 " ) 
- the hiring out of bullock power and to 
each of the other groups and the hiring 
in of bullock power (5 " ) 
- farming as a single aggregate enterprise (1 " ) 
Total (per farm-size class) (18 activities) 
There would be a unique per-unit income receivable for each 
sale of factor service, a unique per-unit cost for each factor 
service purchased, and F.B.I, earned from the farming activity. 
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c. Resource constraints Each group owns a resource stock 
which is classified into five generic types: land (measured in 
hectares), family labor (measured in days per year available), 
fixed capital (capital^ in rupee terms, including buildings, 
non-marketable and non-salvageable implements and other fixed 
capital), movable capital (capitalg including irrigation equip­
ment and other items that can be leased out) and bullocks 
(measured in terms of days per year available). Hence, q* has 
five elements, expressed as upper limits. 
Hired labor inputs are not distinguished from family labor 
inputs on the assumption that both types perform the same tasks 
(excluding management, which is treated as a residual). Perma­
nent servant labor is likewise not distinguished from family 
labor. The presumption is, however, that hired labor is used 
only in the farming activity so that the families in a group 
cannot realize earnings by releasing hired labor from their 
farm employment. 
Two resources that have not been explicitly specified are 
purchased seed and purchased fertilizer. The actual specifica­
tion of these inputs as resource constraints, rather than 
simply subsuming their use in the production function that 
links land, labor, capital, and bullocks to F.B.I, (which has 
been done) would imply that they were "owned resources" which 
generate factor service flows that could be sold as an alterna­
tive to use in the farming activity. This is not the case 
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however. ^ 
In addition to the real resource constraints just defined, 
there would be need for the definition of a constraint to 
depict the operation of a "market" for each of the factor 
services transferred between farm size-classes. Having defined 
a hire-in activity for capital, labor, and bullock days for 
each of the 5 groups into which the other four groups could 
offer factor services, there is need for five markets for each 
type of factor service. For the land transfer between groups, 
the existence of a single rental price meant that a common 
pool could be defined into which all five groups could offer 
their land services and out of which all could rent in land. 
One land market would be sufficient therefore. Each of the 
sixteen market constraints would be defined as equality con­
straints, with a "right-hand-side" of zero. This would have 
the effect of restraining the sale of any unit of factor 
service by one group unless there was a demand for it reflected 
in an increased level of a "hire-in" activity by some other 
group. The net amount in the market would thus always be zero. 
^The intention is not to deny that the availability of 
seed and fertilizer may be a constraining factor on the growth 
of farm output. The nature of the seed and fertilizer con­
straint as it now is in India and policy suggestions for its 
removal are discussed in S. C. Jain, Price Behavior and Resource 
Allocation in Indian Agriculture (Bombay: Allied Publishers 
Ltd. , 1968), and Government of India, Expert Committee on 
Assessment and Evaluation. Modernizing.... 
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d- Input-output coefficients The matrix of input output 
coefficients, B, will be a 41 x 90 matrix, excluding slack 
activities. The majority of the non-zero elements (which are 
few in comparison with the number of zero elements) are units, 
the exception being the entries translating the limited factor 
service flows into farming activities. As in the standard 
programming convention, a positive unity indicates factor 
service use and a negative unity indicates factor service 
augmentation. The general configuration of non-zero coeffi­
cients is given in Figure 3.1 for a given group. This 
configuration is quickly generalized for the other groups by 
rearrangement of the positive and negative entries in the 
labor, capital and bullock rows. 
2. Data sources and manipulations 
All data for the quantification of the model are taken 
from the Studies in the Economics of Farm Management, (The 
Studies), for Uttar Pradesh, 1968-69. The district included 
is Muzaffar-Nagar. The data are unpublished as yet, and were 
collected as the Government of India surveyed 150 farms on a 
cost-accounting basis. The data are given on a farm-by-farm 
basis so that they approximate a mini-census. 
a. Coefficients in the objective function The prices 
paid for days of bullock and human labor, by a given farm-size 
class are the simple quotients of the total amount paid by 
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farms in the class and the total number of days employed by all 
the members of the class. The rates received or potentially 
received by members of one farm size-class for letting-out 
resources services for use by others, is that rate that the 
others have usually paid. Renting out land earns Rs. 600. per 
hectare, and renting in land costs the same amount. Capital 
prices paid for lease in and received for lease out are assumed 
to be the ratio of the average class capital costs (imputed) 
to average class value of capital. The assumption is that a 
farmer in a given group would be willing to pay as much (or 
slightly less) for leased in capital as paid for maintaining 
his own. 
Farm Business Income (F.B.I.) is given by deducting the 
value of paid-out expenses in cash and kind from the total 
value of output (also cash and imputed value). With the pro­
duction function of farming being expressed on a per-hectare 
basis in the example the average F.B.I, per hectare is esti­
mated as a simple quotient of total F.B.I, and hectares for 
the farm size-class as a whole. F.B.I, contains the return 
from fanning accruable to each of the resources specified 
(land, labor, capital, and bullocks) in addition to the manage­
ment required to profitably use seed, fertilizer, organize the 
operation, etc. The per-hectare quantity used in the model is 
a hectare-weighted average for the size-class, and is given in 
Table 3.4. 
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Table 3.4. Production function by farm size-class, initial 
specification, Muzaffar-Nagar1968-69 
Size-class Per-hectare inputs F.B.I. 
;s:,' 
Under 2.02 147.23 1264. 91 298. 72 33. 29 1945. 81 
2.02-4.03 128.57 1008. 12 505. 10 29. 64 2498. 25 
4.04-6.05 104.20 526. 73 315. 54 23. 52 2302. 64 
6.06—10.0 89.52 772. 18 541. 74 23. 09 2289. 20 
Over 10.0 89.01 807. 46 521. 59 19. 94 2353. 02 
Government of India, Studies in the Economics of Farm 
Management, Uttar Pradesh, 1968-69, Part II, Tables (New Delhi : 
unpublished). 
b. Initial resource levels The resource availability 
(that is, days of human and bullock labor, rupees of capital, 
and hectares of land) specified initially is exactly that 
employed in each farm size-class. The estimate of these magni­
tudes is the simple sum of the resource uses in each farm size-
class reported in the Studies...1968-69 (see Table 4.4b). 
c. Input-output coefficients The Studies... 1968-69 
provide the basic data for estimating the input-output coeffi­
cients that convert resources into farming activities that 
generate units of F.B.I, (the "a" values in Figure 3.1). For 
each farm size-class the hectare-weighted average use of human 
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labor, bullock labor, capital^ and capitalg are estimated. A 
unit is specified for the use of land. The unique per-hectare 
production functions used for each farm-size class are given 
in Table 3.4. 
The various coefficients in the production functions 
suggest an interesting contradiction to what has been tradi­
tional wisdom concerning the agriculture of India, namely that 
there is an inverse relationship between farm size and 
efficiency.^ Here, the labor, capital^ and bullock requirements 
are lower for the over 10.0 hectare farms than in the under 
2.02 hectare farms. The traditional view has not always been 
expressed so that it was clear whether the "efficiency" 
referred to was allocative or technical. Never-the-less, a 
recent study claimed that the relationship held when overall 
economic efficiency was the criteria (economic efficiency being 
2 the union of both technical and allocative efficiency). How­
ever, the data used to support these conclusions have been 
generally drawn from The Studies of the 1954-57 era, while the 
data represented here has come from a relatively modern time. 
summary of the controversy up to 1968 is found in 
Jagdish Bhagwati and Sukhamoy Chakravarty, "Contributions to 
Indian Economic Analysis," Amer. Econ. Review, LIX. Part 2, 2-
73 (September, 1969). 
2 L. J. Lau and P. A. Yotopoulos, "A Test for Relative 
Efficiency and Application to Indian Agriculture," Amer. Econ. 
Review, LXI. No. 1, 94-108 (March, 1971). 
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Crown and Srivastava have shown that even with the model pre­
sented by Lau and Yotopolous, there is no reason to assume that 
the inverse relationship holds in India after the green revolu­
tion^ (in fact they suggest that there is good reason to 
2 
suspect the traditional view as well). Crown and Nagadevara 
have shown that this would probably be true for rice as well as 
for wheat-growing regions of India.^ It is evident therefore, 
that while there is not clear evidence in the production func­
tions used in this study that there is a direct relationship 
between efficiency and farm size, the data do not preclude 
such being true. 
3. The initial solution 
With the parameters of the model defined and estimated as 
indicated in the preceding sections, it is reasonable to expect 
Robert W. Crown and Uma K. Srivastava, "The Question of 
Relative Efficiency after the Green Revolution," Journal Paper 
J-7093, Iowa Agricultural and Home Economics Experiment 
Station (Ames, 1971). 
2 Lau and Yotopoulos soften their earlier claim that the 
inverse relationship holds and state that farms are probably 
equally efficient in an allocative sense, but that smaller 
farms possibly show greater technical efficiency. L. J. Lau 
and P. A. Yotopoulos, A Simultaneous Equation Approach to 
Relative Efficiency, Memorandum 104, (Stanford: Research 
Center In Economic Growth, Stanford University, August, 1970). 
^Robert W. Crown and Vishnuprasad Nagadevara, "Tendencies 
in Relative Economic Efficiency and Its Consequences," (paper 
prepared at the Center for Agricultural and Rural Development, 
Iowa State University, Ames, 1972). 
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that the initial solution (the set of activities giving the 
maximum value to the objective) would be that all resources 
were used in farming and that the selection of farming activi­
ties followed were distributed as in Table 3.3. This means 
that one would expect 17 units of farming 1.24 hectares, 33 
units of farming 3.06 hectares, and so on. Alternatively, it 
means that one would expect 21.09 units of farming 1 hectare 
under the production function for the under 2.02 size-class, 
100.97 units of farming 1 hectare under the production function 
for the 2.02-4.03 size-class, etc. This would be the expected 
outcome if farmers had indeed already found the point at which 
their incomes were at a maximum given the alternatives of 
farming or not, and if the economy did impartially find the 
maximum value of the objective, without regard for whose 
income contributed to it. 
The model does in fact yield such a situation (solution 
given in Table 4.4a. It contains only five activities; one 
farming activity for each size-class, at the levels indicated 
by the acreage levels in Table 3.3). The model itself is 
assumed to be predicting the "correct" outcomes for the input 
data given, therefore. 
The task now is to re-quantify the model with parameters 
that depict the situation that results from behavior typical 
of fanners in the various size-classes as they respond to the 
ongoing technical change. 
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IV. AN EXAMPLE OF THE MODEL IN OPERATION; 
OUTCOME UNDER TECHNICAL CHANGE 
In the current example, measuring the impact of technical 
change on size-distribution of income (and so, the distribution 
of welfare) involves (a) estimating the parameters of the model 
after the technical change has just commenced, (b) allowing the 
I  
^ differential behavior of individuals to alter the structure of 
the resource base and optional activities, and (cï determining 
a new optimal set of activities. The strategy assumes that 
the technical change represents a permanent change in the pro­
duction possibilities'and that the capital that embodies the 
new technology is divisible. This means that no group is auto­
matically excluded from using the new technology, although 
economic constraints may vary the levels at which new tech­
nology is employed. 
The third chapter contained the construction of the 
initial post-technical-change state of the economy. That 
analysis is now extended to consider the impacts of (i) the 
behavior of individuals with respect to re-investment using 
the income generated in the "initial solution" and (ii) the 
opening of new production possibilities and production 
functions (as generators of income) as re-investment occurs. 
The specific technical change analysed here, the green revolu­
tion in wheat, does not violate the assumptions behind the use 
of this model. 
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A. Allocation of Income 
A set of decisions is made in house-holds concerning the 
allocation of income among various uses. Equation 2.3 in 
Chapter II showed the individual allocating a portion of income 
to the acquisition of capital (in human^ non-human, and con­
sumer durrable forms; essentially for the improvement of his 
and his family's financial and social position over time). The 
equation could be viewed in ex post time as the identity 
Y = + A 
c 
The magnitude of A was determined by the individual through 
a set of discussions incorporating his intertemporal consump­
tion preferences, attitudes towards risk and uncertainty, and 
his perception of prices versus productivity (the elements in 
the vector 6 would be the reduced form elements of his decision­
making system). Data should reveal the net result of this 
allocation. The magnitude of A is itself, the sum of alloca­
tions among many forms of asset (A = Z Aq*.*) so that it too j ] 
could be disaggregated to show the ex post allocations among 
various forms, data permitting. 
1. Allocation of income for family improvement 
The Program Evaluation Organization (P.E.O.) reports 
estimates of the expenditure patterns of adopters of the high 
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yielding wheat varieties in various states in India.^ They 
report the total expenditures of surveyed farms by state, on 
productive farm assets, consumer durables (that is, personal 
capital accumulation) social functions, institutional invest­
ment, loan giving and loan repaying. They also report these 
expenditures as per-farm averages for farms in different farm-
size classes, but for all India as a whole. An obvious data 
problem thus presents itself; namely, the derivation of 
behavioral indications for farmers in a district of a state, 
with size-class subdivision available only at a national level. 
It is assumed that the state of Uttar Pradesh weights the 
national averages sufficiently, so that the all-India farm 
size-class percentages (estimated based on the data given by 
P.E.O.) applies to that state's totals. Further it is assumed 
that the district of Muzaffar-Nagar (the current study district) 
is sufficiently representative of the state of U.P. that the 
indicated expenditures by farm size classes for the state apply 
to the farms in the district. The calculations based on these 
assumptions, and the resulting division of Farm Business Income 
into expenditures for family subsistence and expenditures for 
family improvement (that is, investment in production assets, 
social functions, consumer durables, etc.), are given in Table 
4.1. 
^Government of India, Planning Commission, Program Evalua­
tion Organization, Evaluation Study of H.Y.V. Program, Babi 
1968, (New Delhi: author, 1969). 
Table 4.1. Allocation of farm business income between family maintenance and 
improvement, by farm size-class, 1968-69, Muzaffar-Nagar and Uttar Pradesh 
Farm size-class 
(hectares) 
Under 2.02 4.04 6.06 Over 
2.02 -4.03 -6.05 -10.0 10.0 
Farm business income^ 2,399. 41 7 ,600. 12 11,313. 53 17 ,373. 22 32 ,178. 35 
Expenditure on . 
family improvement 1,558. 80 2 ,786. 00 6,638. 27 7 ,137. 27 10 ,212. 90 
Expenditure on 
family maintenance^ 840. 61 4 ,814. 12 4,675. 26 10 ,235. 93 21 ,965. 45 
Revised expenditure , 
on family improvement 900. 00 1 ,600. 00 6,313. 00 7 ,373. 00 12 ,178. 00 
Government of India, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Directorate of Economics 
and Statistics, Studies in the Economics of Farm Management, Uttar Pradesh, 1968-69, 
Part II, Tables (New Delhi; unpublished, 1971) 
^Defined as expenditures on productive assets, consumer durables, social 
functions, loan giving and repayment and others. 
^Estimated by subtracting expenditures for family improvement from Farm Business 
Income. 
^Assuming an expenditure for family maintenance of Rs. 1500 for the under 2.02 




The results indicate a direct relationship between the 
size of farm and the level of expenditures both to maintain the 
household and to acquire capital, make and repay loans, engage 
in social functions and so on (the family improvement expendi­
tures) . The data support a hypothesis that the larger a farm 
in hectares, the larger the fixed commitments for maintenance 
of family and permanent servants. 
The estimated maintenance level in the under 2.02 
hectare class is extremely low, indicating that the level of 
estimated expenditure on "family improvement" is probably too 
large. Writings of other authors^ indicate that the minimum 
caloric intake per person per day could be purchased in Uttar-
Pradesh for Rs 146, per annum, (in 1961-62) and that prices 
rose 168.7% between then and 1967-68, (so that the minimum 
could be purchased in 1967-68 for Rs 248). Further, if the 
average family size in rural communities among the poorest 20% 
of the population was cibout 6.0, then at least Rs 1,500 would 
be required to maintain the family. Consultations and personal 
observation support this view. An expenditure on family 
improvement of about Rs 900 is used subsequently. Further, 
there has been an arbitrary "smoothing" of the relationship 
between the expenditure estimates in all classes. The esti­
mates of expenditures for family improvement used in the 
^V. M. Dandekar and Nilakantha Rath, Poverty in India 
(New Delhi; Ford Foundation, December, 1970). 
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subsequent analysis are listed in Table 4.1 as well. 
2. Allocation of family improvement expenditures for 
productive asset acquisition 
The estimated expenditures for family improvement given 
in Table 4.1 are further subdivided to indicate the amounts 
spent for various types of productive assets; land, land 
improvement, irrigation equipment, buildings, machinery and 
implements, and livestock. Again, the P.E.O. reports expendi­
ture totals by state, but the expenditures by farm size-class 
on an "all India" basis. The class-specific family improvement 
expenditures given in Table 4.1 can thus be allocated among the 
various productive asset classes by subdividing the totals in 
accordance with the national percentages. These expenditures 
are given in Table 4.2. 
To convert the amounts spent on various productive assets 
into new resources conformable with the definitions of 
resources in the model's constraints, estimates of the prices 
of units of land, and bullocks, and the number of days of 
power that could be expected from a bullock are required. 
The price of land per hectare payable by a farmer in a 
given size class is assumed to be the per hectare asset value 
of land currently held in that class. A unifs-rm price would 
not necessarily exist since farmers operating larger units 
would be in a position to bid higher for better available land. 
Table 4.2. Allocation of expenditure for family improvement among productive assets, 
by farm size-class, 1968-69, Muzaffar-Nagar and Uttar Pradesh 
Item 
Under 












improvement per farm 900. 
(Rs.) 
Class total^ (Rs.) 15,300. 
Fraction for 












0.389 0.471 0.478 0.509 
20,518 95,089. 130,290. 192,308. 
Portion for land 
Amount (Rs.) 










0.190 0.213 0.214 0.170 













buildings^ 0.095 0.019 0.131 0.111 0.239 
Portion for machine and 
implements^ 0.012 0.121 0.154 0.177 0.219 
Total fixed capital 
(Rs.) 674.03 2,886.88 27,100.37 58,906.23 79,250.13 
% increase^ 2.5 2.8 32.5 27.0 23.0 
Portion for irrigation 
equipment^ 0.125 0.160 0.221 0.223 0.178 
Amount (Rs.) 787.96 3,272.62 21,024.18 29,615.58 34,269.29 
% increase^ 12.5 6.4 42.1 19.4 15.4 
^From Table 4.1. 
^Multiplied per-farm expenditure by the number of farms in the class (17,33,32, 
37, and 31 farms respectively). 
^Fraction of total expenditure spent on productive assets: Government of India, 
Planning Commission Program Evaluation Organization, Report on High Yielding Varieties, 
Rabi, 1968-69 (New Delhi: author, 1969) all-India proportions used. 
^Fraction of total expenditure on productive assets spent on item. Government of 
India, Report on High Yielding Varieties... . 
^Assumed values, since the asset value was below that of next smallest farm-size 
class with which the families in this class would have to compete for renting in or 
buying land. 
^New additions as percent of original constraint level. 
Table 4,2. (Continued) 
Item Farm size-class 
(hectares) 
Under 2.02 4.04 6.06 Over 
2.02 -4.03 -6.05 -10.0 10.0 
Portion for bullocks^ 0. 662 0. 509 0. 280 0. 275 0. 19: 
Amount (Rs.) 4,188. 53 10,451. ,89 26,662, ,96 35,855. ,81 27,057. 75 
Price per bullock^ 463. ,43 612. ,42 591. ,63 655. ,90 686. ,88 
Pairs bought (no.) 3 4. 89 13. 43 16. ,89 15. ,16 
Days worked per pair^ 40 63. ,0 73. 6 78. 5 102. .3 
Days added 120 308, .2 989, .0 1,326, , 2  1,551, .0 
% increase^ 17, .1 10 .3 26, .6 20, .3 18, .3 
^Government of India, Studies..., Uttar Pradesh, 1968-69, pp. 91-105. 
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The estimated asset value of land in each farm-size class is 
calculated as a simple average from data in The Studies, and 
listed in Table 4.2. Buying land, of course, is not the only 
means of effective acquisition; since there could be land 
reclamation activity, or land improvement that increases the 
effective hectarage relative to a previous time period. Land 
improvement expenditures are added to land acquisition expendi­
ture for this reason.^ 
The Studies contain data on the asset value of livestock 
on a farm-by-farm basis. It is assumed that all livestock 
have the capacity to be draught animals and that the price 
payable per head is the present asset value per head. The 
average number of head acquired, by class, is thus estimated 
(see Table 4.2). The Studies also give the data from which the 
average number of days worked per bullock-pair on farms of each 
size-class is estimated. The total number of days of bullock 
power available is given as the product of the estimated 
number of head acquired and the estimated work output per head 
(see Table 4.2). 
Capital constraints (Capital 1 and Capital 2) were 
initially expressed in rupee terms, so that expenditure estimates 
are already conformable to original constraint definition. The 
^The growth in effective hectarage farmed is not large 
enough to place any farm in a farm-size class other than the 
one which it was initially assigned. 
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labor constraint is not changed by behavior in this example. 
In the period covered, even by the "long" run, it is presumed 
that neither population or the labor force has time to grow.^ 
However, the individual is permitted to transfer his labor to 
different employers in the model. The model thus shows 
laborers as earning a rent on an essentially fixed supply as 
productivity increases. 
B. New Production Possibilities 
Over time, and in conjunction with the process of 
acquiring new productive assets, it becomes possible for the 
farmer to change the production patterns that lead to his 
generating farm business income and family welfare. He has the 
option of altering the input mix for any given unit of land 
area, as he responds to changes in relative market prices, and 
changed relative physical productivities in the inputs. He 
has the option of changing the scale, or capacity of inputs by 
switching to more crop-specific and specialized equipment, 
land configurations, labor types and so on. He could also 
alter the mix of enterprises to align them with projected or 
^In the study, the "long" run refers to the time it takes 
for farmers to learn of and begin to apply the production 
techniques of individuals with different farm sizes. This time 
would be shorter than that usually associated with "the long 
run"; when say, fixed capital lost some of its fixity. In this 
model capital that is initially fixed is always fixed. 
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revealed changes in prices, or profitabilities. The limit to 
which he can exercise the options, however, is still con­
strained by the level of available resources after new 
resources are acquired, and the competing uses of class-
specific factors. 
In the short run, suppose that the individual identifies 
with farmers in his own size-class.^ Also, assume he prefers 
to try demonstrated methods rather than be experimental, to 
minimize uncertainty as to outcomes. Thus, in the short run, 
a farmer is viewed as considering the demonstrated production 
methods within his size-class, as possible candidates for 
introduction on his farm. 
Data in the Studies is sufficient for the estimation of 
intra-size-class production functions representing the produc­
tion demonstrated by sub groups in a size-class. The per 
hectare levels of labor, capital, leasable capital, and bul­
lock power, along with the level of F.B.I, per hectare were 
2 
estimated for 5 sub-classes within each size-class. These 
sub-classes subdivide the size-class into fifths, according to 
a ranking of the farm business income earned. Thus, for 
^The short run the period in which the farmer is most 
aware of the possibilities already demonstrated by farmers of 
his own size, in the context of this model. 
2 In the under 2.02 hectare class, only 3 sub-classes are 
defined. 
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farmers in each size-class, there would be an alternate 
production function yielding a high farm business income per 
hectare, one yielding a medium high income, and one yielding 
a medium, a second smallest and a small or low income. 
The resource requirements of these alternatives are given in 
Table 4.3. The model places no requirement that all of the 
resources be used in one-and-only-one production pattern, since 
the 5 variants and the class average variant would be con­
sidered as competitive but not mutually exclusive. 
In time, however, farmers can be viewed as coming to 
recognize the possibilities for increasing F.B.I, per hectare 
by adopting the demonstrated production patterns of farmers in 
other size-classes. For example, a farmer of 10 hectares might 
anticipate earning more by considering his holdings as two 5-
hectare holdings, and farming accordingly. However, a farmer 
of 5 hectares would be constrained by size of holding from 
aspiring to the per-hectare income available to a farmer of 10 
hectares by considering himself as operating a 1/2-a-ten-
hectare holding. In this time, arbitrarily called the "long 
run"^, therefore, it is assumed possible for farmers to imitate 
the production patterns of farms in smaller size-groups, but 
^In reality this "long" run may cover a small amount of 
time, since it would be possible for a farmer to go through the 
entire stepped process of reinvestment and process-change 
simultaneously , and plan for this simultaneous change without 
separating his thought processes. 
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Table 4.3. Intra-class production functions by farm-size 

















Farm 1 Lo 
Farm 1 Md 
Farm 1 Hi 
2.02-4.03 
Average 
Farm 2 Lo 
Farm 2 Sc 
Farm 2 Md 
Farm 2 Mh 
Farm 2 Hi 
4.04-6.05 
Average 
Farm 3 Lo 
Farm 3 Sc 
Farm 3 Md 
Farm 3 Mh 
Farm 3 Hi 
6.06-10.0 
Average 
Farm 4 Lo 
Farm 4 Sc 
Farm 4 Md 
Farm 4 Mh 
Farm 4 Hi 
Over 10.0 
Average 

























































































































































Government of India, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, 
Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Studies in the 
Economics of Farm Management, Uttar Pradesh, 1968-69, Part II, 
Tables iNew Delhi : unpublished, 1971). 
^Lo,Sc,Md,Mh,Hi, designate low, second lowest, medium, 
medium high and high F.B.I, per hectare respectively. 
'^Capitalis fixed, capital2 is variable. 
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not possible for them to imitate patterns of larger farms. 
C. The Economy After Technical Change 
The initial, short run and long run solutions for the 
groups in the economy are stated in Table 4.4a. These solu­
tions should not be interpreted as representing a "before" and 
"after" situation with respect to the technical change, rather 
they should be viewed together as indicating a trend of change 
set in motion by the advent of the green revolution. Table 
4.4b contains a statement of the levels of resource use and 
shadow prices. 
1. The solution's acceptability 
The initial solution was judged to be acceptable, because 
it precisely reflected the known situation in 1968-69 farm size 
and structure of activities. The short-run solution, appears 
acceptable, judged by equally subjective criteria. First, all 
land in the economy is employed, which is consistent with an 
a priori impression that the economy is land-scarce. Second, 
there is no evidence of "brokerage" in the system; that is 
farmers do not hire-in and hire-out the same resource and make 
a profit on the trade. Third, no size-class hires-in resources 
and allocates these to slack or non-use. There is slack in the 
system, however, indicating that either some of the decisions 
to acquire resources were not motivated by short-run profit 
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Table 4.4a. Initial, short run, and long run optimal 












ROLl — —  21.1 21.1 
H0L1T3 — —  3105 — 
H0L1T5 —  —  — 3105 
L0C1T5 — —  7088 
HOBIT5 —  —  — —  631 
Farm 1 21.09 —  —  —  —  
2.02-4.03 
R0L2 93.4 101. 6 
HOL2T3 —  —  392 —  —  
HOL2T4 — —  —  —  7534 
HOL2T5 —  —  5448 
LOC2T5 54273 
HOB2T5 —  —  1094 —  —  
Farm 2 100.97 
Farm 2 Hi — 8.26 
4.04-6.05 
RIL3 —  —  12.65 —  —  
R0L3 —  —  —  —  160.00 
HOL3T5 —  —  16344 
HIL3 3497 —  —  
LOC3T5 —  —  14717 70234 
HOB3T5 — — 415 4675 
Farm 3 158.14 — — — 
Farm 3 Hi — 173.75 —  —  
Farm 2 Hi in 3 —  —  — 1.11 
6.06-10.0 
HI14 —  —  —  —  7534 
H0L4 2894 —  —  
LOC4T5 —  —  —  —  5927 
Farm 4 282.24 
Farm 4 Hi —  —  285.96 100.33 
Farm 2 Hi in 4 — 185.63 
Over 10.0 
RIL5 101.81 282.72 
HIL5 14373 24897 
LIC5 14717 137522 
HIB5 — — 1508 5306 
Farm 5 425.81 — — —  —  
Farm 5 Mh — —  383.58 —  —  
Farm 5 Hi — —  148.42 —  —  
Farm 2 Hi in 5 —  —  —  —  73.80 
Farm 3 Hi in 5 — — 78.22 
Farm 4 Hi in 5 —  —  560.88 
Table 4.4b. Resource use levels and shadow prices in initial, short run and long run 
optimal solutions 
Class and Initial Short run Long run 
resource^ useb use s.pC use s.p 
Under 2.02 
Land 21.1 21.1 14,55.85 21.1 2,553.84 
Labor 3,104.0 3,105.0 12.59 3,105.0 3.367 
Capital, 26,677.0 — — — — 
Capitalg 6,300.0 — —  — — 7,088.0 0.229 
Bullocks 702.0 —  —  —  —  630.8 — — 
2.02-4.03 
Land 101.0 101.6 1,435.85 101.6 2,553.84 
Labor 12,982.0 12,982.0 12.59 12,982.0 3.367 
Capital, 101,790.0 — — — — — — 
Capitals 51,000.0 — —  — —  54,272.6 0.229 
Bullocks 2,993.0 —  —  — —  —  — — 
4.04-6.05 
Land 158.1 161.1 1,456.85 161.1 2,553.84 
Labor 16,493.0 16,493.0 12.59 16,493.0 3.267 
Capital, 83,297.0 110,397.0 0.086 1,349.9 
Capitalg 49,900.0 29 ,986.0 — 70,724.0 0. 229 
Bullocks 3,719.0 4,718.0 4,708.0 
6.06-10.0 
Land 282.2 286.0 1,972.52 286.0 2,554.25 
Labor 25,267.0 25,267.0 12.59 25,267.0 3.370 
Capital, 217,939.0 144,527.0 — —  276,845.0 (+)G 
Capital- 152,900.0 173,892.3 — —  182,515 0.229 
Bullocks 6,517.0 5,708.0 — — 7,588.3 —  —  
Over 10.0 
Land 425.8 430.2 1,456.85 430.2 2,554.84 
Labor 37,904.0 37,904.0 12.59 37,904.0 3.370 
Capital, 343,822.0 423,072.1 0.034 423,072.1 ( + ) 
Capital. 222,100.0 256,369.0 (+) 256,369.2 0.230 
Bullocks 8,492.0 10,043.0 (+) 10,043.0 
^Resource units are hectares (land), rupees (capital) and days (labor and 
bullocks). 
^Use only, since shadow prices are assumed to be market prices in this case. 
*^Zero shadow price indicates quantities of factor not used. 
^(+) indicates shadow price of less than Rs. 0.01. 
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maximizing anticipations, or that acquisition errors were made 
relative to the profit maximizing criteria. 
The long run solution (that found when farmers are 
permitted to apply the demonstrated production functions of 
farmers in smaller size-classes, but not those in larger) meets 
similar criteria of acceptability. In addition, when the long-
run production possibilities are allowed, even fewer resources 
were committed to non-use compared to the short-run solution. 
Notably, the category of capital (capitalg, mainly irrigation 
equipment) subject to lease-out arrangements, is fully employed 
in the long run. Bullocks are traded, but there is slack 
bullock power in the economy so that a marginal value of bul­
locks is zero. Any income earned by hiring out bullocks would 
thus be the result of pure bargaining, or hiring jointly with 
labor. 
2. Class-specific impacts 
A summary of the net receipts accruing to families in 
farming, families who used to farm, and traditionally hired 
labor is given in Table 4.5. The following discusses these 
magnitudes: 
a. Families initially in the under 2.02 hectare class 
As new investment permits new production possibilities in the 
short-run, the marginal value of labor increases (as indicated 
Table 4.5. Summary of size-class distribution of income in initial. short run and 
long run optimal solutions 
Income source and class Initial Short run Long run 
(rupees) 
Under 2.02 40,787 — — 6 
Net 2.02-4.03 250,808 26,115 —  —  
from 4.04-6.05 362,025 420,125 3,504 
farming 6.06—10.0 642,807 787,662 875,505 
Over 10.0 999,528 1,029,276 1,526,449 
(2,295,955) (2,263,078) (2,405,457) 
To Under 2.02 65,818 64,986 
former 2.02-4.03 — — 260,485 309,000 
farmers 4.04-6.05 — 462,683 
as rents 6.06—10.0 — —  — 
and wages Over 10.0 —  —  — —  — — 
(326,303) (836,699) 
Total wages Under 2.02 ( 317) B 827 3,991 1,067 
to tradi­ 2.02-4.03 ( 1978) 5,459 24,903 6 ,660 
tional 4.04-6.05 ( 1060) 12,954 63,705 17,037 
hired men 6.06-10.0 ( 9116) 24,796 114,770 30,694 
in class Over 10.0 (19090) 48,107 240,343 64,276 
(92,143) (447,713) (119,734) 
Value of economy^ 2,388,098 3,037,094 3,360,860 
^Days of hired labor initially employed. 
^Underestimated by amounts paid out to bullocks, leased in capital, taxes and 
land, traditionally hired in even in the initial stages. This amount is fairly 
small, however. 
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by the divergence of the shadow price of labor^ upwards from 
the market price in the initial period). Similar tendency 
2 
occurs for land value. By hiring out all of the 2788 family 
labor-days (including the permanent servant labor) and renting 
out the land newly acquired and previously used in independent 
farming, the families in the class could anticipate short-run 
earning of Rs. 65,819, or about Rs. 3,872 per family (see 
Table 4.6). This represents a 61 percent increase over the 
income per family earned from farming alone. Indeed, even if 
the resources of the under 2.02 hectare size-class were employed 
in the "high F.B.I, per hectare" variant, the class would only 
realize an income of about Rs. 45,000 before land became 
limiting. The members of the small farm size-class, therefore, 
are considerably better off relative to their own former posi­
tions by hiring out labor and renting out land. 
In the long run, these families lose income because the v 
marginal value of labor declines^ (but still exceeds the market 
prices paid in the initial situation), but gain as the marginal 
^Shadow price of labor in shorter-run is Rs. 12.59 as 
opposed to a market price of Rs. 2.52-2.76 depending on the 
purchaser (Table 4.4b). 
2 Shadow price of land, Rs. 1455.82, versus land rental of 
Rs. 600.00 per hectare. 
^Longer run shadow price of Rs. 3.367 per labor day. 
Table 4.6. Income per family by farm size-class, in initial, short run and long run 
optimal solutions 
Class and number Initial Short run Long run 
- rupees-
Landless (40) 2,303.57 11,130.00 2,995.84 
(+4.845)3 (+1.298) 
Under 2.02 (17) 2,399. 3,872. 3,823. 
(+1.614) (+1.593) 
2.02-4.03 (33) 7,600. 8,685 9,364 
(+1.143) (+1.232) 
4.04-6.05 (32) 11,313. 13,126 14,568 
(+1.160) (+1.288) 
6.06—10.0 (37) 17,373. 21,288. 23,662. 
(+1.225) (+1.362) 
Over 10.0 (31) 32,243. 33,203. 49,240. 
(+1.030) (+1.527) 
^Parenthetical figures give the ratio of the income estimate relative to the 
initial income estimate. 
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value of land increases past the value of the shorter-run 
magnitude.^ In the longer run, as leasable capital becomes 
scarce in the economy, these families also gain as they lease 
2 
out capital. Overall, the families in the class realize about 
Rs. 64,986, or Rs. 2,823 per family (a 59 percent increase over 
the initial per-family income). 
Actually receiving this income however, depends on the 
family's ability to bargain for wage, interest, and land rent 
rates that reflect the actual marginal value of the input in 
use; that is, the estimate is based on the assumption that the 
labor, land and capital markets are perfectly competative (free 
of market imperfections). If there are market imperfections or 
factor-service monopsony, so all benefits of technical change 
were allowed to accrue to the users of hired-in resources 
(assuming that the rates in the initial period were paid) the 
families in the small farm-size class could expect only about 
Rs. 20,600 or about Rs. 1,212 per family.^ This is consider­
ably below the income of mere subsistence of Rs. 1,500 per 
family considered earlier. With longer term production possi­
bilities open the families might expect about Rs. 1,800 per 
^Longer run shadow price of Rs. 2553.84 per hectare. 
2 Longer run shadow price of Rs. 0.229 per rupee-value 
leased out. 
^This would be the value if labor earned Rs. 2.56 per day 
and land earns Rs. 600.00 per hectare. 
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family.^ 
But with the existance of these market imperfections, the 
small farm-size families would not abandon independent farming, 
even if all hired-in labor were bid away. Using family labor 
alone, families could expect to earn at least Rs. 36,850 or 
2 
about Rs. 2,170 per family from farming their own land. 
Therefore the farmers in this small-farm size-class would only 
release the land and labor (and capital in the longer run) 
necessary for the expansion of production in larger units if 
they were paid at least half of the marginal value of the 
resources in use as wage and rental rates.^ 
b. Families initially in the 2.02-4.03 hectare class 
The small level of farming carried out by families in this 
class in the short run indicates that they all but abandon 
independent farming. After releasing the 1978 labor days that 
were formerly hired-in, and employing about 1110 family days 
in reduced farming activity, labor wages and land rent earns 
about Rs. 260,485 for the class. With the farming activity 
^Assuming again that labor earns Rs. 2.52 per day, land 
earns Rs. 600.00 per hectare and capital earns Rs. 0.12 per 
rupee-value leased out. 
2 This assumes that 2788 family days used in the average 
farming activity permits 19 units of farming to occur, which 
earns Rs. 1,946 of F.B.I, per unit. 
^In the short run, if labor and land were paid only half 
of their marginal value, the small-farm families would earn 
about Rs. 2,540 each, which would constitute a net gain over 
the intiial state. 
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included, the families enjoy income of about Rs. 8,684.83 per 
family, representing an increase of about 14 percent compared 
with the initial situation. In the longer run, assuming that 
the wage, rental and lease-out rates are equivalent to the 
marginal value of the resources, the families in the class earn 
Rs. 309,000 or about Rs. 9,363 per family (a 23 percent 
increase). 
As in the case of the small-farm families, the income 
estimates are made assuming that resource owners receive factor 
service rates equivalent to the factors' marginal values. In 
the case of this farm-size class, resources in the short run 
would have to be paid at least 3/4 of the marginal value in 
order for families to be as well off hiring-out as they were 
when farming, using their own resources in independent farming. 
c. Families initially in the 4.04-6.05 hectare class 
In the short run, farm families in this class tend to adopt the 
production mix and scale demonstrated by the farmers earning 
the highest F.B.I, per hectare in their class. This is not 
At initial market prices, families as a whole earn Rs. 
127,386. The difference between the market and shadow-price 
values of resources is Rs. 159,213. If families in the class 
receive Rs. 120,000 in addition to the Rs. 127,386, or three-
quarters of the marginal value of land and labor, they receive 
Rs. 247,386. This compares with Rs. 250,808 earned from farm­
ing in the initial stages. Actually, if farmers in this class 
moved to a higher income variant of the farming activity, they 
would need to be paid even more than the three-quarters of the 
marginal value of abandon farming, since their opportunity 
cost would have risen. 
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simply due to the fact that the return per hectare is higher, 
but also is dependent on the lower resource uses per unit in 
the production function. The class realized income of Rs. 
516/693. This is an overestimate, however; since the measure 
of F.B.I, per hectare reported in Table 4.3 is calculated 
assuming that hired-in resources are paid the initial market 
rates. But if labor and land are assumed to receive rates 
identical to their marginal values, the true value of F.B.I, 
per hectare would be lower. The difference is the new marginal 
value less the initial market price, times the number of units 
of hired-in resource. The adjusted short run overall F.B.I, is 
Rs. 420,025 or about Rs. 13,126 per family (an increase of 16 
percent over the initial per-family income). 
In the long run, however, farmers in this class find it 
profitable to cease independent farming, in spite of their 
adopting the production patterns, scale, and mix of inputs 
typically employed by farmers in the next smallest size-class 
(the high income variant of the 2.02-4.03 hectare class). They 
can earn an overall income of Rs. 466,186 or about Rs. 14,568 
per family (an even larger increase relative to the initial 
situation) by renting all but a small amount of land, hiring 
out family labor, and leasing out unused capital, at rates 
identical to the marginal values of the resources. 
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d. Families initially in the 6.06-10.0 hectare class 
With the acquisition of resources, families in this class tend 
to adopt the production patterns, output mix, and input mix 
demonstrated by the earners of high F.B.I, per hectare within 
their own class, in the short run. Again, for this class, the 
per-hectare F.B.I, indicated in Table 4.3 overestimates the 
actual F.B.I, attainable if producers are forced to pay the 
marginal value per unit employed. The F.B.I, earned by the 
class as a whole when adjusted for the difference between the 
marginal value of factors and the initially paid rates, is 
Rs. 787,662 or about Rs, 21,288 per family. This is a 23 per­
cent increase over the initial per-family F.B.I. 
In the solution, the farm families appear to be adopting 
more capital intensive practices since they are shown to be 
releasing (hiring out) labor. The 2894 days released is 
assumed not to be family labor since there is still hired labor 
employed in the short run solution,^ and in this economy it is 
assumed that a farm would release hired labor before family 
labor. 
In the long run, another production pattern would be 
optimal for families in the 6.06-10.0 hectare class. They 
would combine the former high-income variant demonstrated by 
^There were 9116 hired-in days employed in the initial 
solution, to supplement the 16,151 family and permanent servant 
days. With 2894 days released, there would still be 6223 hired 
days employed. 
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farmers of their own class, and the high income variant of the 
former 2.02-4.0 3 hectare class. This combination is apparently 
labor intensive relative to the short run situation, since the 
solution shows families in this class hiring in labor while 
leasing out capital. In this case, as in the short run situa­
tion, they are required to pay the difference between the 
initial market price and the marginal value of labor assuming 
that the wage rate approaches the marginal value. After 
adjustment, the class realizes Rs. 875.504 and families realize 
on the average Rs. 23,662 (which is a 36 percent increase over 
the initial per-family F.B.I.). 
e. Families initially in the over 10.0 hectare class 
Farm families in this class tend to adopt the production 
techniques of the farmers in the class formerly earning high 
and medium-high levels of F.B.I, as they make new investments. 
This is not an obvious or simplistic result since the produc­
tion functions of these two variants given in Table 4.3 show 
that these two variants tend to be more costly in terms of 
labor, bullock power, and capital than the average variant used 
in the initial solution. The short run solution shows the 
families in the class renting in land, leasing in capital and 
hiring in labor. When the F.B.I, earned is adjusted for the 
assumption that the rates paid out are identical to the 
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marginal values of resources,^ and the labor already employed 
the class income is Rs. 1,029,278. Each family realizes an 
increase of about 3 percent relative to their initial positions. 
In the long run, however, families in this class tend to 
adopt the technologies yielding the highest income per hectare 
in the 2.02-4.03 hectare class, the 4.04-6.05 hectare class, 
and the 6.06-10.0 hectare class. When adjusted for differences 
between the initial market rates paid out and the marginal 
2 
value of resources, F.B.I, per family increases by 53 percent. 
f. Initially landless families Although not explicitly 
included, the model encompasses income earning activities for 
landless rural families. In Uttar Pradesh, typically, 20 per­
cent of all families in rural areas are landless.^ In the 
current example, with 150 farming (therefore landed) families 
as representative of the state economy, 40 landless families 
would be implicitly present in the model. Each family would 
contribute on average 890 days of labor to agriculture. This 
represents full-time employment for a family of 6 (the average 
^The adjustment includes the payment of the difference 
between the short run shadow price of land, Rs. 1455.82 and the 
initial rental price of Rs. 600.00 per hectare. 
2 The adjustment includes the payment of the difference 
between the long run shadow price of land, Rs. 2553.84, and the 
initial rental price of Rs. 600.00 per hectare. 
^Government of India, Cabinet Secretariat, National Sample 
Survey, Seventeenth Round, 1961-62 (New Delhi: author, 1963). 
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rural family size) for 5 months of the year. This is a reason­
able situation considering that there are generally 2 seasons 
of 2-1/2 months each in which intensive hand planting, weeding, 
and harvesting occurs. 
Under these conditions, and with wage rates as in the 
initial period, an average family would earn Rs. 2,304 per 
year. If labor earned its full marginal value, a landless 
family would earn up to Rs. 2,996 in the long run situation. 
This would be a 30 percent increase. 
D. Implications of the Solutions 
1. Relative size-distribution of income under technological 
change 
The size-distribution of income among groups is depicted 
in two ways, in Table 4.7; the first showing relative per-
family incomes with respect to that of the average family in 
the under 2.02 hectare class, the second, with respect to the 
per-family income of the 4.04-6.05 hectare group. 
The ratios, presented in Table 4.7 indicate that the 
disparity between large and small farm family incomes (when 
families are identified as in the initial solution) is not 
growing. But there is less relevance in using terms like 
"farm family" in these short run and long run situations. 
Farms in the under 2.02 hectare class cease their independent 
operations in the model, hence they cannot continue wearing the 
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Table 4.7. Incomes per family relative to the under 2.02 
hectare® class, and the 4.04-6.05 hectare class 
in initial, short run and long run optimal 
solutions 
Size-class Initial Short run Long run 
(hectares) 
Landless 
w.r.t.^ under 2.02 0.96 
w.r.t. 4.04-6.05 0.20 
Under 2.02 
w.r.t. under 2.02 1.00 
w.r.t. 4.04-6.05 0.21 
2.02-4.03 
w.r.t. under 2.02 3.17 
w.r.t. 4.04-6.05 0.67 
4.04-6.05 
w.r.t. under 2.02 4.72 
w.r.t 4.04-6.05 1.00 
6.05-10.0 
w.r.t. under 2.02 
w.r.t. 4.04-6.05 
Over 10.0 
w.r.t. under 2.02 13.44 
w.r.t. 4.04-6.05 2.85 
^Calculated from Table 4.6. 
^w.r.t. = with respect to. 
°Ratio ignored since ir short run, marginal value of 
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label of "small farm". Indeed the farmers of the 4.04-6.05 
hectare class apparently become the "small farmers" in the long 
run, and the disparity between the family incomes of this group 
and those in the over 10.0 hectare class grows (see the ratios 
relative to the family income of the 4.04-6.05 hectare class). 
But with a landless class included, and the discussion 
framed in terms of "rural" families (not farm families), the 
impact of the technological change becomes clear (see Table 
4.7). While all families gain, the families that continue 
farming on a large scale (those in the 6.06-10.0 hectare and 
the over 10.0 hectare classes) improve relatively. The families 
that become fully dependent on the resource markets for income 
(the landless, under 2.02 hectares, and the 2.02-4.03 hectare 
farm families) tend to lose relatively, even though the 
families that originally farmed holdings of under 2.02 hectares 
make some relative gain. Among families remaining as independ­
ent cultivators, the spread in relative income grows. 
Farmers initially within the over 10.0 hectare class gain 
relative to both the farms in the 6.06-10.0 hectare and those 
in the 4.04-6.05 hectare classes. Further, farms in the 6.06-
10.0 hectare class gain relative to those in the 4.04-6.05 
hectare class.^ 
^This agrees with a prediction made by Uma K. Srivastava, 
Robert W. Crown and Earl 0. Heady, "Green Revolution and Farm 
Income Distribution," Economic and Political Weekly, VI, No. 52. 
Review of Agriculture, A-163—A-172 (December, 1971). 
100 
2. Relative factor shares under technological change 
The analysis permits the quantification of changes in the 
functional income distribution following the technical change. 
A complete analysis of all factors is not possible in each 
iteration, since the shadow prices of resources going unused is 
zero. However, an analysis of the land and labor share is 
possible throughout, and a longer run indication of capital's 
share is suggested. The comparison of shares, and the ratios 
of income of labor to land and to capital is given in Table 
4.8. 
In the initial situation, the returns to land, labor and 
capital are the prices received per unit hired, rented out or 
leased out. The assumption is that the cost-accounting pro­
cedure used in collecting the data for the Studies sets prices 
equal to the marginal products. The value of labor in the 
initial situation is the sum of the values of hired-in labor 
(given in Table 4.5) and family labor as given in the Studies. 
The return to capital is the product of the quantity of capital 
employed and the interest rate that the farmer is willing to 
pay for the next unit leased in summed over classes. Land 
earns a uniform Rs. 600.00 per hectare. In the short and long 
runs, the return to resources is the product of the shadow 
price (the marginal value of the resource) and the quantity 
employed. 
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Table 4.8. Factor shares changes, 
run optimal solutions 
initial, short run, and long 
Item Initial^ Short run^ Long run^ 
Values (rupees) 
- land 592,950. 1,455,809. 2,553,763. 
- labor 227,168. 1,205,505. 322,394. 
- capital 56,673. ~ 130,664. 
- economy 2,388,098. 3,037,094 3,360,860. 
Ratio of values 
- lab/land 0.38 0.83 0.13 
- lab/cap 4.01 — — 2.47 
Shares w.r.t. 
economy 
- land 0.25 0.48 0.76 
- labor 0.10 0.40 0.10 
- capital 0.02 — — 0.04 
^Land: no. of hectares farmed times Rs. 600 (imputed 
rent) 
Labor: value paid or imputed for hired and family labor 
reported in the Studies 
Capital: imputed rates of interest to capital times the 
amount of variable capital (capitalg) employed 
Economy: from Table 4.5, including net returns to 
fanning plus wages paid to hired in labor. 
^Each input item value is the product of the amount 
employed times the marginal value product. Economy value is 
taken from Table 4.5. The difference between the value of the 
economy and the sum of labor and level shares is the share 
attributed to fixed inputs-
*^Each input item value is the product of the amount used 
and the marginal values product. Economy value is from Table 
4.5. The difference between the economy value and the sum of 
shares is the share attributed to other fixed factors. 
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The short run distribution is somewhat distorted by the 
fact that fixed capital has no revealed marginal value. But 
the long run distribution shows that land and capital gain, 
relatively, while labor simply retains its relative position. 
This indicates that the technological change tends to be land 
and capital augmenting. 
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
A. Model Characteristics 
The typical means of studying the effects of technical 
change on the distribution of income has been through the study 
of changing relative factor shares. This type of analysis 
begins with the definition (or at least the assumption) of a 
fully aggregated macro production function in which variables 
such as "labor" or "capital" are arguments. From knowledge of 
factor share movements, however, only weak inference can be 
drawn to the likely impacts of technical changes on the rela­
tive sizes of individuals' incomes. 
The model developed in the second chapter was designed to 
explicitly show the impacts of technical change directly as 
leading to changed relative incomes of individuals (or near-
homogeneous groups of them). The model allowed for the 
measurements of the impacts without prior regard for the source 
of the families income flow or what factor-service earned the 
income. Throughout, a maintained assumption was that attaining 
a maximum level of income under the constraints imposed by 
market prices, demands and factor availabilities would be 
necessary before an individual could begin to maximize his 
welfare. 
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The model employed an optimization procedure, and so 
served to indicate what could be attained under the constraints 
impose, not what would occur within some confidence limit. In 
addition, the prediction was internally consistent. 
As a bonus, the impacts of technical change could be 
observed as they influence relative factor shares as well as 
individuals' incomes. 
B. Empirical Findings 
When quantified with data for 1968-69, depicting a 
district agricultural economy in India (the Muzaffar-Nagar 
district of Uttar Pradesh), the model yields several results 
of interest, bearing on several issues of current interest with 
regard to India's green revolution in wheat production. 
1. Optimal activities 
In the models' solutions, there is a tendency for farming 
activities to concentrate in the hands of the farm families 
cultivating the largest holdings. Families initially farming 
smaller holdings tend to "rent" out their land and to hire out 
their labor services to the operators of the larger farms (see 
Table 4.4a). In the model, the concept of "renting" was 
maintained, although this could mean selling and taking a form 
of mortgage payment over time for the title. 
Of real significance, moreover, is the fact that this 
tendency, predicted by this model as being an optimal situation. 
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has actually been observed in an on going occurrence. Frankel 
cites cases in the Punjab in which small land owners overcome 
the capital constraints to their adopting the H.Y.V.'s as they 
"'rent' out small holdings of 2 to 4 acres to 
large farmers, who then supply the actual owners 
with the modern inputs for cultivation and take 
50 percent of the crop as their share. 
The indication in the model is that small farmers have 
been able to realize larger incomes by, essentially, abandoning 
independent cultivation (but not necessarily resource owner­
ship) (see Table 4.6). Large farms have also benefited from 
the opportunity to expand the sphere of management, and earn 
added returns for their own fixed resources in the process. 
It is also significant that as large land owners expand, they 
move to adopt the production practices previously demonstrated 
on smaller farms. 
2. Income distribution 
As would be expected, it is possible under reorganization, 
for the value of the economy to increase after technical change. 
With the base parameters selected, indications are that there 
can be a 40 percent output growth relative to the initial value, 
under full adjustment (the long run) and one of 27 percent 
^Francine R. Frankel, India's Green Revolution; Economic 
Gains and Political Costs (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1971) pp. 34-35. 
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with partial adjustment with a moderate infusion of new pro­
ductive assets (land, power sources, fixed capital, and movable 
or leasable capital, but the same labor force) (Table 4.5). 
The results suggest that a set of circumstances exist in 
which all participants in the agricultural economy can gain 
relative to their own initial positions, including landless 
laborers, when the economy attains the new optimum (Table 4.6). 
Granted, there is an implicit assumption that factors earn 
their marginal value products as returns per unit of resource, 
which implies an absence of market imperfection. Nevertheless, 
this result is significant in that it shows that a general 
improvement in individual welfare would be possible from policy 
to removing market imperfections. Elaborate programs of wealth 
and asset redistribution would not be required to attain a 
Pareto efficient outcome from the technical change (although 
they might be required to attain other goals related to equity 
and relative income distribution). 
This application of the model has not assumed, directly, 
which factors would be favoured in technical change. Yet the 
results of the analysis show that the green revolution could 
be characterized as being land and capital (movable capital) 
augmenting if the input parameters reflect reality (Table 4.8). 
Labor retains its share of the economy's value and gains in 
absolute amount. Fixed factors, including fixed capital and 
management lose relatively. 
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The central concern in this study, however, has been with 
the redistributing effects of the technical change with respect 
to family incomes. The application indicates that income 
earned by farm-operating families (those who remain in farming 
in the long run situation) becomes generally less equitably 
distributed (Table 4.7); as the ratio of per-family income of 
large farms in relation to that of medium sized farms grows 
from 2.85 to 3.38. Further the ratio of per-family income of 
the largest to next-largest farms grows from 1.85 to 2.08.^ 
The more significant finding, moreover, is that there 
would be a general divergence in the relative incomes of rural 
families (including the initially landless and those who cease 
independent farming operations in the long run). The exception 
to this divergence is the relative rise in the incomes of the 
initially small farms (the under 2.02 hectare class)(Table 
4.7). This divergence occurs in spite of a general rise in the 
income level of all families relative to their respective 
former positions. 
^This divergence of relative farm incomes is in agreement 
with the qualitatively predicted divergence given in Carl H. 
Gotsch, "Technical Change and the Distribution of Income in 
Rural Areas," Amer. Journ. of Agric. Econ., LIV, p. 339 
(May, 1972) ; under the assumption that the green revolution is 
a simple, divisable, and labor-using technical change, that 
there is a general lack of community organization for equitable 
distributions, and the assumption that Indian social organiza­
tion is largely hierarchical. 
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C. Conclusions and Implications 
1. With respect to the model 
The model appears to be capable of indicating the "correct" 
outcome of a technical change as viewed for the standpoint of 
income distribution among families or individuals. When 
applied to the agricultural economy, the optimization indicate 
a tendency in the size-distribution that is consistent with the 
qualitative predictions in abstract of Gotsch,^ and the semi-
2 
empirical predictions of Srivastava, Crown and Heady (who used 
a set of equations based on farm production functions to 
analyse the distribution problem). 
By correctly predicting the impacts of technical change on 
size-distribution of income, in the absence of policy changes, 
moreover, the model might reasonably be expected to yield 
accurate predictions of the outcomes of policy change as well. 
The improvement in the basis for social policy formulation 
represented by this model can be indicated in a brief demonstra­
tion. Recall the demonstration in Chapter I that factor share 
information would only weakly infer the likely changes in the 
^Gotsch, "Technical change and..." 
2 Uma K. Srivastava, Robert W. Crown and Earl 0. Heady, 
"Green Revolution and Farm Income Distribution". Economic and 
Political Weekly, VI, 52, Review of Agriculture A-163—A-172 
(December, 1971). 
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size-distribution of income. The model in application showed 
labor to be a relatively losing factor; from which might be 
infered that laboring families are relative ' twers also. In 
the model, the landless families, offering only one factor 
service for sale, were indeed, relative losers , so that the 
inference from factor share movements is strong (both direc-
tionally and in extent). 
In a contrasting case, however, consider the families 
initially farming holdings of under 2.02 hectares (who were the 
most labor intensive cultivators per hectare) in relation to 
farms of over 10.0 hectares (the least labor intensive per 
hectare) . While land is seen to "gain" three-fold with respect 
to labor, (see Table 4.8) families on average in the large-farm 
class " lose " relative to the labor intensive farms, by 4 per­
cent (see Table 4.7; the ratio of 12.88 to 13.44 is about 
0.96). Relative factor share movements indicated neither the 
direction not the extent of the change in relative incomes. 
The relative gains of small-farm family participation in land 
and capital markets, essentially compensated them for relative 
losses incurred by participating in labor markets. 
The model presented in this study, therefore, makes a 
contribution by providing a systematic framework for the 
determination of the "net" family income impacts of diverse 
shifts in factor shares. 
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2. With respect to optimal organization of agriculture 
The tendency in the optimal situations resulting after 
the technical change has had an opportunity to influence the 
economy is for factor services to be employed in the initially 
larger farms, in conjunction with the management and fixed 
capital of those farms. These flows of factor services 
realign without necessary changes in ownership patterns of 
assets. 
a. Factor intensity Of significance, moreover, is 
the indicated structure of production that appears optimal; 
that is, the selection of production functions made as the 
optimal set and the combination of them at different levels 
on the farms continuing to operate (see Table 4.3 for specifi­
cation of the alternatives, and Table 4.4 for the functions 
selected and their levels). 
In the long run solution, farms in the 6.06-10.0 hectare 
and over 10.0 hectare classes recombine production functions 
previously employed by farms of smaller acreage that have 
ceased independent activity. In so doing, the configuration of 
production tends to become more labor intensive in both classed 
^In the initial situation, farms in the 6.06-10.0 hectare 
class employ a production function which has a capital-labor 
ratio of 14.7 and a labor-land ratio of 90 days per hectare. 
These ratios become 13.8 and 115 days per hectare in the 
longer run solution. For the farms in the over 10.0 hectare 
class, the capital-labor ratio goes from 14.9 to 13.8 and the 
labor-land ratio falls from 89 to 88 days per hectare. 
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b. Relative efficiency The tendency for large farms 
to imitate the technical production functions of previously 
smaller farms is significant for the question of relative 
economic efficiency in Indian agriculture. This question, in 
turn is significant, in that knowledge of relative efficiency 
would guide government policy as it seeks to stimulate growth 
with efficiency. 
When there were ample real alternatives in the model for 
forming the optimal set, having a selection taken from the 
production functions of the initially smaller farms means that 
small farms were the most efficient technically, in terms of 
using least amounts of resources per unit of output.^ The 
question of the relative allocative efficiency of small versus 
large farm families is not at issue in this model, however. 
Indeed, the model has assumed that there was no difference 
in the allocative efficiency of farm families. In optimal 
situations large farm-size families would tend to employ the 
technical relationships formerly employed by the smaller farms. 
Whether or not small farms used to be relatively more efficient, 
therefore, (even in the technical sense) becomes irrelevant 
for discussions of current or future policy. 
^This conclusion is supported by L. J. Lau and P. A. 
Yotopoulos, A Simultaneous Equation Approach to Relative 
Economic Efficiency, Memorandum 104, Research Center in 
Economic Growth (Stanford; Stanford University, 1970). 
112 
c. Cooperatives The interpretation of the long run 
behavior of formerly small farms has been that they rent and 
hire out land and labor to larger farms. But their activity 
at optimum can also be interpreted as being their abandonment 
of independent management, such as would occur in the forma­
tion of cooperatives. As a practical matter, the encourage­
ment of the formation of cooperatives is a part of current 
Indian agrarian policy^ and the success of the policy has been 
2 
subject of controversy. 
Jain has indicated that there might be gains from coopera­
tives particularly for farmers of small fragments 
"where individual farming has lost its meaning 
because of almost inconceivably small-scale 
operations".^ 
The problem would be one of discovering and emphasizing the 
rewards of cooperation as an incentive to overcoming the 
barrier of social status attached to independence. 
For a statement of some of the issues involved, see R. S. 
Shiwalker, "Agricultural Organization," in Changing Indian Agri­
culture , edited in S. C. Jain, 128-68 (Bombay: Vora and 
Co., 1966). Shiwalker discusses the Panchayati Raj or govern­
ment instigated cooperatives, the independent cooperatives and 
the credit cooperatives, their formation and problems. 
2 Policy to improve the cooperative form of agriculture is 
discussed by the Government of India, Expert Committee on 
Assessment and Evaluation, Modernizing Indian Agriculture. 
Vol. I and II (New Delhi; author, 1969,70). 
^S. C. Jain, "Technical Changes and Their Diffusion" in 
Changing Indian Agriculture, edited by S. C. Jain, 56-71 
(Bombay: Vora and Co., 1966) p. 61. 
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The solution in the present model indicates that there 
would be considerable economic reward accruing to the small 
farmers from cooperation. The estimates of income per family 
given in Table 4.6 were calculated on the basis that there 
would be the same number of families after the technical change 
as before it. Suppose, however, as an example, that instead of 
the 31 families in the over 10.0 hectare class that the Rs. 
1,526,449 total income for the class was to be divided by 40 
"families" (in this case let the 9 new "families" be coopera­
tives). In this case, the per-family income would be Rs. 
38,161, and the average farm size would be about 14 hectares 
(compared to Rs. 49,240 per family and 18 hectares with 31 
farms). There would still be an improved family income 
possible for the farm initially in the over 10.0 hectare class, 
but the increase would be 18 percent with respect to the its 
initial per-family income, rather than the 53 percent growth 
accruing in the absence of cooperatives. 
If the initial holding size in the 2.02-4.03 hectare 
class is 3.06 hectares and the average holding for the under 
2.02 hectare farms is 1.24 hectares (Table 3.1) only 4 of the 
2.02-4.03 hectare farms, or 11 of the under 2.02 hectare farms 
would have to cooperate to farm a 14-hectare cooperative.^ 
In the study, there would be enough farms to form 9 extra 
families out of the 17 farms initially under 2.02 hectares and 
the 33 farms initially between 2.02 and 4.04 hectares. 
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The long run per-family income of Rs. 38,161 would be suffi­
cient to give each of the 4 cooperating farm families an 
income of Rs. 9,540 (or a 26 percent increase compared with 
the initial farm family income in the 2.02-4.04 hectare class) 
(see Table 4.6). Each of the 11 cooperating families would 
receive Rs. 3.470, which is less than the amount attainable 
without cooperation (Rs. 3,823; see Table 4.6), but which is 
still an increase of 45 percent with respect to the initial 
family income of one in the under 2.02 hectare class.^ 
Cooperation would lead to improved income distribution in 
addition to income growth as in the example. The ratio of 
income per family between the average over 10 hectare and the 
under 2.02 hectare farm would be 11.00 under cooperation, 
compared to the 12.88 in the long run without cooperation 
(Table 4.7). The ratio of income per family between an average 
over 10 hectare farm and one in the 2.02-4.04 hectare class 
would be 4.00 with cooperation compared with 5.25 in the long 
run without cooperation (calculated from Table 4.6). 
For these reasons, cooperation might, indeed, be a viable 
alternate to policies of land redistribution, taxation with 
transfers, subsidization for inputs and price supports. To 
^The assumption of 10 farms cooperating rather than 11 
would make the income from cooperation competitive with that 
attainable without cooperation. 
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some degree this has no doubt been recognized in India, where 
recent policy has been to increase the amounts of and decrease 
the terms and length of debt period for loans made through 
credit cooperatives.^ 
3. With respect to rural employment 
The tendency for the optimal set and levels of production 
activities to be relatively labor intensive, given the produc­
tion pattern of the initial stage, raises the question of the 
capacity of the green revolution to be employment creating. 
Johnston and Cownie suggest that the potential might be large, 
in light of experience in Japan and Taiwan, and events in 
2 Pakistan's adaptation of the new seeds. Frankel observed a 
growing demand for year-round labor in the Punjab, and a 
particularly high demand at harvest time (demand exceeding 
supply, even including in-migration).^ 
With the present model and application, the question can 
be restated to ask the level of labor force employable at dif­
ferent marginal value products. As an experiment, the number 
^These activities of the Reserve Bank of India (India's 
central bank and major institution for monetary policy) are 
reviewed in Government of India, Expert Committee on Assess­
ment. .., Modernizing... . 
2 See Bruce F. Johnston and John Cownie, "The Seed-
Fertilizer Revolution and Labor Force Absorbtion," Amer. Econ. 
Review, LIX, 4, 569-82 (September, 1969). 
^Frankel, India's Green Revolution, p. 35. 
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of days of labor available for hire (that is, the effective 
labor force) was raised parametrically in 1 percent increments 
through 10 iterations. This eventual 10 percent increase in 
labor availability would be consistent with a 25-30 percent 
growth in population, given current participation rates.^ 
As would be expected as a limiting resource increases in 
an optimization problem, the value of the program grew and the 
marginal value of the resource in use fell. However, the 10 
percent growth in labor supply was sufficient only to reduce 
the marginal value by 1/3 of a percent (from 3.367 to 3.357), 
while the value of the objective rose by about 1 percent. 
The application here suggests that the reorganized agri­
culture and would be able to offer employment opportunities 
well in excess of likely increases in labor supply. 
4. With respect to policy for equitable redistribution 
The agreement between the conclusion of the study and 
others, that the distribution of income among individuals 
following the green revolution will likely become more inequit­
able, raises questions as to what policy instruments might be 
helpful in regaining equity. Two commonly posed answers are 
^Participation rates given in Government of India, 
Planning Commission, Report of the Committee of Experts on 
Unemployment Estimates (New Delhi: author, 1970), p. 42-43. 
The rural participation rate is about 40 percent. 
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found in the proposals for land redistribution, and taxation 
of the relative "gainers" with the transfer payments to the 
relative loosers (that is reliance on resource and fiscal 
policy). 
a. Land redistribution to landless individuals The 
results of the application show, that in the long run, creating 
a farm of average size in the under 2.02 hectare class (that 
is, making one 1.24 hectare farm) penalizes the value of the 
economy in excess of Rs. 780^ if the average experienced pro­
duction function for that class (as given in Table 4.3) is put 
into effect on the new farm. If the production function 
appropriate to the highest income farms in the class in the 
initial state was put into effect, the income foregone by the 
economy would be greater than zero, but by an unknown amount. 
But, by establishing such small farms for landless 
families, the policy maker would be, in effect, granting them 
an annual income of Rs. 2400 if the average production function 
were used, or an income of Rs. 3154.56 if the best-earning 
production function was enforced. This would improve their 
incomes, even relative to their income under the long run wage 
^The estimate of Rs. 780 is taken from the standard output 
of the program of optimization, being the per-unit income 
sacrifice to the economy of forcing a unit of the activity 
involved into the basis. The estimate would underestimate the 
cost of establishing the farm by the amount required to buy 
the land, the equipment, and so on to allow the operation to 
function. 
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rates (as in Table 4.6). Land redistribution appears, there­
fore, to have an equity benefit for these families. 
But the equity goal cannot generally be served through 
this instrument. If a family who formerly farmed an average 
under 2.02 hectare holding independently were forced to con­
tinue farming (rather than renting out, hiring out labor, or 
forming a cooperative) they would be required to forgo the 
extra Rs. 669 earned by following another income earning 
strategy (the difference between the Rs. 3,823 that could be 
realized by the cessation of independent operations and the 
Rs. 3,154 accruing to a farm under the high income variant of 
farming). 
b. Taxation and transfers A brief exploration of the 
possibility of taxing agricultural production with a tax per 
unit of land farmed is conducted in the context of the present 
study. Tax-paying was introduced as an activity in the 
analysis, linked to the farming activity so that both activi­
ties enter the basis together if either one does. 
Using the average taxes per hectare paid in the size-
classes as reported in the data collected in the Studies, the 
farming activities as reported in Table 4.4a are sufficient to 
generate a tax pool of Rs. 10,723.^ If redistributed equally 
^This is the sum of the following products: 1.11 x Rs. 
13.32; 285.96 x Rs. 11.67; and 712.90 x Rs. 10.36. The latter 
numbers of each product are the tax rates. Notice, that tax 
rates are inversely related to the farm size, that is the tax 
system is regressive. 
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among the landless rural families, each family could increase 
its income by about 9 percent. 
The long run solution to the optimization is fairly sensi­
tive to changes in the tax rates however. The "range" around 
the given tax rate within which the tax could be varied without 
altering the basis or the value of the program is about 0.60 of 
a rupee. Therefore, an initial indication is that the existing 
method of taxation would not be useful for the collection of 
greater volume of resources needed for more extensive transfer 
schemes. 
D. Suggestions For Quantitative Policy Analyses 
The implications of the application seem to suggest that 
the model could yield quantitative answers to a variety of 
policy problems. Three possible extensions are mentioned here. 
In the area of land policy: the model could be further 
employed even with the application as given, to explore the 
possible variants of land reform that might increase equity in 
rural income distribution more fully. Under a broader defini­
tion, a full resource policy, both with and without respect to 
cooperatives could be included. Possibly some combination of 
landless family participation with small-scale landed (or even 
moderately sized farm family) families could alleviate the 
uncertainty of the landless family with respect to income and 
welfare, and the uncertainty and constraint on the landed 
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family of adequate labor input simultaneously. 
With this application, the trade-offs between the goals 
of growth in output and income and equity in the distribution 
of this income using land as a policy instrument could be fully 
quantified. 
Considering tax policy: the model could be expanded to 
include the specification of various tax mechanisms other than 
the land tax currently in operation. Moreover, even within 
the confines of land tax; the redistribution impacts of 
government's striving for progressive (or at least not regres­
sive) rate structures could be determined. With this, the 
relative gains and losses resulting from the tax policy could 
be simultaniously brought into the analysis. 
Lastly, with regard to the employment potential of agri­
culture following the green revolution; other significant 
variables could be added to the analysis, within the context of 
the current application to account for the impacts of changing 
family size under growing income, migration propensities under 
wage-rate differentiation, the substitution of hired for family 
labor, and the extent of substitutability of machine for labor. 
(Considering the tendency for the economy to select the labor 
intensive production functions even when labor became a 
relatively more scarce input.) There would be distributional 
impacts of each of these elements that would be observable in 
the model at the family level. 
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